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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide deeper insights into our 
understanding of the influence of ownership structure on corporate financial 
decisions and corporate performance in the UK market. Specifically, we 
investigate the corporate governance role of financial institutions in their invested 
companies. Our study provides two main contributions: first, it explores the 
significant heterogeneity across institutional investors according to their trading 
behaviour; and second, it takes into consideration the complicated ways in which 
institutional monitoring interacts with other governance mechanisms. Using an 
original and very detailed dataset for a large sample of UK listed companies, our 
analysis shows that institutional investors to some extent influence the whole 
corporate sector in terms of director pay, dividend policy and firm performance. 
Although institutional investors, as a whole, make no appreciable difference to 
director pay, we find that dedicated institutions (institutions with expected long 
investment horizons) not only restrain the pay level, but also strengthen pay- 
perforniance link. In addition, our analysis suggests that ownership concentration 
and dividend policy might act as substitutes in reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetry. We detect more significant dividend smoothing 
behaviour in firms controlled by financial institutions, which one would expect to 
suffer from greater agency costs and inforination asymmetry than firms controlled 
by directors and other individual shareholders. Finally, we find that institutional 
ownership is associated with better fim-1 perfom-iance, and that institutional 
viii 
ownership and executive ownership can 
mechanisms with respect to performance. 
be complementary governance 
ix 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
The need for corporate governance arises from potential conflicts of interest 
among stakeholders in the corporate structure. Berle and Means (1932) addressed 
these conflicts by examining the separation of ownership and control. One of the 
most debated aspects involves managers and shareholders. ' When there are 
asymmetric information and imperfect contractual relations between managers 
and shareholders, mangers have an incentive to act in their own interest, usually 
at the expense of the shareholders. For example, management might adopt sub- 
optimal strategies that include continuing projects that are not maximising value, 
expropriating funds from the company to maximise their own utility function (e. g. 
luxury projects, empire building and transfer pricing), engaging in activities that 
make managers indispensable, manipulating performance measures and resisting 
takeovers. 
2 
The consequences of these divergences are often referred to as agency costs, 
which are conventionally defined as the costs of structuring, bonding and 
monitoring an incentive contract between the principal (shareholder) and the 
agent (manager). Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), there has been a great 
deal of empirical work providing evidence that financial decisions and, hence, 
firm performance are significantly affected by the presence of agency conflicts 
(Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Gomper et al., 2003). The underlying notion in this 
strand of the literature is that managers' self interest, which is reinforced by the 
' The conflicts of interests might also exist between debtors and shareholders (e. g., Myers, 1977), 
or between large shareholders and small shareholders (e. g., La Porta et al., 1999) 
2 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Tirole (2006) for reviews of how managers may not act in the fin-n's best 
interests. 
absence of strong corporate governance., 3 can lead firrns to adopt sub-optimal 
financial policies to the detriment of shareholders. 
In this regard, several elements of firm ownership structure have been 
suggested as tools for potential corporate governance in resolving a manager- 
shareholder conflict. One ownership characteristic that may be an important 
instrument in monitoring management is the presence of large external 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The fact that using managerial 
ownership helps to align the agent to the interests of the principal is also well 
documented in the literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 4 Other internal 
mechanisms may be found in the financial decisions of firms. A recent source for 
the monitoring of firrns has come from institutional investors, which can also 
decrease agency costs in this area. Pozen (1994) discussed many methods that 
institutional owners are using to affect managerial decision making, ranging from 
informal discussions with management to proxy fights for control of the 
company. The involvement of institutional shareholders in corporate governance 
is expected to influence corporate financial decisions and consequently corporate 
perforniance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). t-- 
Corporate governance has been a long-standing issue for debate, and this 
was given fresh impetus, at least in the UK, by a number of well-publicised 
corporate problems from the 1980s onwards. These involved the build-up of huge 
3 Corporate governance is defined as a broad term for a range of corporate controls and 
accountability mechanisms designed to protect the interests of shareholders. 
4 Nonetheless, since Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983), a growing body of studies have 
started to recognise that increasing shareholding also delivers increased voting power and 
effective control over the finn, which managers may use to extract resources from the firm. 
5 See, for example, Easterbrook (1984) and Gugler (2003) for dividend payment, Jensen (1986) 
and Firth (1995) for debt financing and Murphy (1999) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) for 
managerial compensation. 
3 
excess capacities, unscrupulous managers expropriating stakeholders' funds, a 
weak link between executive compensation and company performance and 
unusually high and downwardly inflexible dividend payments. Although the 
popular belief is that British institutions are passive investors because they rarely 
cast their votes at annual general meetings (Plender, 1997), recent anecdotal 
evidence seems to suggest that, even if institutional shareholders do not publicly 
intervene, they do act behind the scenes (IMA Survey, 2004; NAPF Survey, 
2005). The controversial role of UK institutional investors in corporate 
governance warrants more research in this area; previous studies were mainly 
undertaken under the US framework (Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
Despite the fact that the US and UK governance systems are both market-based, 
the two countries differ in two aspects: first, institutional ownership in the UK is 
much higher than in the US; 6 and more importantly, unlike their US counterparts, 
UK institutional investors are not known for using their voting rights or raising 
proposals when a fin-n's corporate governance is bad. Thus, testing the influence 
of institutional investors on corporate governance in a dominated market like the 
UK's will strengthen the evidence that has been provided to-date. 
These argutnents provide the basis for the research that is conducted in this 
thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to provide deeper insights into our 
understanding of the influence of ownership structure on corporate financial 
decisions and perfom-iance in the UK market. Specifically, this thesis investigates 
the corporate governance role of financial institutions in their invested companies. 
6 Institutional investors collectively own around 80 percent of market shares in the UK (National 
Statistics, 2007), primarily by insurance companies (14.7%), pension funds (12.7%) and overseas 
investors (40%). 
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It also explores how the involvement of institutional investors vanes with 
circumstances, and how these changes can alter their influence on company 
governance and financial decisions. However, it has been difficult to conduct 
irrefutable tests on the effects of institutional holdings. There is no consensus on 
the exact nature of the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance, or how this relationship affects a finn's financial decisions and 
perfonnance. The evidence concerning whether institutional investors provide 
effective monitoring is mixed. 
One explanation for the lack of consensus is the difficulty in differentiating 
between institutional investors, which are clearly not a homogeneous group, and 
the monitoring ability might thus differ across institutions. A typical way to 
classify institutional investors is by their legal type and their claimed 
susceptibility to management influence (Brickley et al., 1988; Faccio and Lasfer, 
2000) .8 However, the UK has few regulatory firewalls that separate mutual funds 
from insurers on the one hand, and commercial banks from investment banks on 
the other. Insurers often run a separate mutual fund business and vice-versa. in 
addition, most commercial banks have investment banking subsidiaries, which 
possibly suggests that the typical classification is not appropriate for a UK study. 
Another frequently expressed concern is that institutional investors systematically 
adopt a time horizon that is too short to make them effective monitors. Several 
U. S. studies suggest that institutions with high portfolio turnovers (and hence 
7 Parrino et al. (2003) suggest that institutional investors influence board decisions, whereas there t 
are studies that find no evidence of a monitoring role exerted by institutional investors (Faccio and 
Lasfer, 22000; Renneboog, 2000). 8 Insurers and banks are thought to be more vulnerable to managers because of possible 
commercial relationships with fim-ns, while pension funds managers are thought to be more 
independent. 
5 
expected short investment horizons) are less likely to specialise in monitoring and 
influencing efforts (Bushee, 1998; Jennings, 2005, Chen et al., 2005). To our best 
knowledge, no UK study concerning institutional monitoring addresses this issue 
yet. 
Another difficulty in conducting tests on the effects of institutional 
shareholdings lies in modelling the complicated interactions of different 
governance mechanisms. Most literature treats the ownership structure, the board 
and financial characteristics as independent mechanisms. There might be 
substitutionary or complementary ways, however, of reducing agency costs and 
enhancing firm performance such that the impact of one mechanism may depend 
on the chosen level of another. For example, dividends need not constitute an 
additional control device when alternative mechanisms (e. g. shareholders' 
monitoring) are at work, otherwise this may simply lead to unnecessary liquidity 
constraints and risks of under investment (Renneboog and Szilagyi 2007). There 
is a great need to widerstand the links among corporate governance mechanisms. 
Although progress has been made recently, there does not yet appear to be 
sufficient clarity concerning both their substitutability and complementarity. 
Our study uses a uniquely constructed dataset that includes detailed and up- 
to-date infortnation on the ownership structure,, board structure and other financial 
characteristics for a large sample of UK listed companies. There are three 
important aspects of our study, which differentiate it from previous studies. First 
of all, distinct from most UK literature, we explicitly consider the significant 
heterogeneity with regard to the monitoring ability across institutional investors. 
Following prior U. S. research (Bushee, 1998; Wahal and McConnell, 2000), we 
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classify institutional investors based on their observed investment and trading 
behaviours. We classify institutions into two groups: (1) "transient" institutions, 
which buy and sell their investments frequently and exhibit a high portfolio 
turnover; and (2) "dedicated" institutions, which leave their positions unchanged 
for a considerable length of time and have a low portfolio tun-iover. 9 Financial 
institutions with a portfolio turnover in the top 25% (bottom 75%) of the turnover 
distributionlo are considered to be transient (dedicated) institutional investors with 
little or no commitment to monitoring and disciplining activities. Our work sheds 
light on the heterogeneity in monitoring across institutional investors, which in 
turn has important implications for the debate about the proper degree of 
institutional involvement in corporate governance. 
Second, we attempt to take into consideration the complicated ways in 
which institutional monitoring interacts with other governance mechanisms. 
Following previous research (Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003), 
we investicrate whether the presence of significant institutional shareholding leads t- 
to lower director pay levels, but a stronger pay-perfon-nance link; we also 
examine the substitutability of dividend policy and shareholder control in 
mitigating agency cost and information asymmetry. In addition, we analyse the 
potential interactions between the monitoring of institutional investors and the 
governance mechanisms in the board, e. g. the incentive effect provided by 
director ownership and the supervisory role of non-executive directors. 
9 For an investment company, a portfolio turnover rate is an annualised rate found by dividing the 
lesser of purchases and sales by the average of portfolio assets (e. g. Bloomber com). :D9 10 We find that the turnover of institutions in the UK is quite low, with a median turnover of 0. Out 
of 1802 institutions, only 561 institutions traded their significant shareholdings (>--), %) in non- 
financial listed firms in the years 200' ) and 2004. 
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Finally, to conduct our empirical investigation, we employ sophisticated 
cross-sectional and panel data methodologies that help control for the endogeneity 
problem, which can arise in this context for several reasons, e. g. reverse causality, 
unobserved heterogeneity. When the panel data is available, we employ the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998); otherwise, we use the 
average cross-sectional regression approach of Ragan and Zingales (1995) to 
control for endogeneity. We believe that our method provides us with robust 
empirical results. 
We start this thesis by looking into how the governance role of institutional 
investors affects two important corporate financial decisions: director pay and 
dividend policy. Director pay is a key governance tool in resolving a manager- 
shareholder conflict (Murphy, 1999). Using perfonnance- sensitive pay contracts, 
shareholders attempt to provide directors with incentives that help align the 
interests of both managers and shareholders. On the other hand, dividend asserts 
cash payments to shareholders and also helps to reduce agency problems 
(Easterbrook, 1984). As an external governance mechanism, the presence of 
institutional investors is expected to encourage or discourage other governance 
mechanisms, depending on whether they act as complements or substitutes. 
Subsequently, we test the theory that the involvement of institutional investors in 
governance and a board's decision making would influence the management 
quality and firm perfonnance. 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 empirically examines the 
determinants of director pay for a sample of publicly traded, non-financial firms 
8 
in the UK. To conduct our investigation, we include in our empirical analysis 56-33 
non-financial listed firms over the period 2000 to 2004. Although there are some 
UK studies examining the impact of institutional investors on the determination 
of director pay, the results of these are mixed. ' 1 1n addition, prior studies also 
ignore the heterogeneity across institutional investors. Chapter 2 aims to address 
this gap by providing a detailed investigation of the role of institutional investors 
on UK director pay. More specifically, our analysis attempts to provide insights in 
the following two questions: first, does ownership by financial institutions exert 
any influence on director pay level and the pay-performance link? And secondly, 
does the presence of dedicated (transient) institutional investors impact director 
pay more or less significalitly? 
Using cash compensation as the dependent variable in our cross-sectional 
regressions, our analysis reveals that company size and cash holdings are 
significant finn-specific characteristics in explaining the pay levels for both CEOs 
and executive directors. We also find that institutional investors, as a whole, make 
no appreciable difference either to pay level or pay-performance sensitivity. 
However, after we group institutions into the "dedicated" and "transient" 
categories using their portfolio turnover, we find evidence suggesting that 
dedicated institutions restrain the level of director pay and strengthen the pay- 
perfon-nance link. This is consistent with our expectation that dedicated 
institutions are more involved in corporate governance and serve a better 
monitoring and disciplining role than other institutions. We argue that our 
II For example, Cosh and Hughes (1997) examine the link- between executive pay and firm 
characteristics in the UK and find no appreciable influence of institutional investors. More 
recently, examining 414 large UK companies, Ozkan (2006) fmds that institutional ownership has 
a significant and negative impact on CEO compensation. 
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analysis provides new insights and helps to explain why the extant literature on 
the role of institutional monitoring has produced insignificant results. 
Using a dataset from 2000-2006, the primary objective of Chapter 3 is to 
investigate whether any systematic relationship exists between the dividend 
choices of UK firms and their controlling shareholders. Given that strong 
shareholders exert their control power, there might be no need for the dividend 
policy to constitute an additional monitoring or signalling device. For fim-is that 
are controlled by directors and individual shareholders, neither major conflicts of 
interest nor large information symmetry is present between management and the 
owners (Gulger, 2003). 1 In contrast, the direct involvement of the controlling 
financial institutions in the management of the fin-n is less likely than for 
individual shareholders (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Gugler, 2003). Hence, dividend 
can be a valuable monitoring or signalling device. We hypothesise that firms 
controlled by financial institutions are more likely to be dividend payers, paying 
relatively stable but not low dividends, compared to firms controlled by director- 
owners and other individuals. 
We use a random-effect probit model and Linter's (1956) partial adjustment 
model (PAM) to investigate whether the identity of a controlling shareholder 
group affects dividend policy. To control for endogeneity, we apply a GMM-in- 
system estimation for the PAM, which includes lagged differences of the 
variables as instrw-nents for the equations in levels, in addition to using levels as 
instruments for the difference. The analysis shows some interesting patterns in 
12 W'hen the directors are the largest shareholders, they bear the major part of the costs and receive 
the major part of the benefits of their actions. This further translates into more flexible payout 
policies since dividend as a monitoring and signalling device is less valuable. Similar patterns 
should persist in individual -c ontro Iled firms. 
10 
UK firrns' dividend behaviour. Although there is no consistent evidence 
suggesting that firms controlled by financial institutions are more likely to be 
dividend payers, we detect significant dividend smoothing behaviour in these 
finns. In contrast, it appears that finns controlled by directors and other 
individuals formulate their dividend payout policy based on their earning income 
and other firm-specific characteristics. 
Chapter 4 examines the link between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. Our study examines whether institutional ownership makes any 
appreciable difference to finn performance, either directly or indirectly. We 
assume that institutional investors affect the efficiency of governance 
mechanisms 13 regarding the board by moderating their relationships with firm 
performance. We also consider additional factors that might provide disincentives 
to institutional monitoring. For example, a free-rider problem may exist and, in 
the presence of other external large shareholders, institutions are able to take 
more of a "back seat". In addition, institutional investors might be coerced into 
voting with the executives; nonetheless, institutions that hold an influential stake 
could probably overcome any conflicts and use their clout to appropriate 
corporate business. We thus further our study by developing another hypothesis: 
that the influence of institutional investors on firm performance will be more 
significant if no other large external shareholding is present, or if there is a single 
institutional shareholding larger than the executive ownership. 
I -, We specifically analyse the potential interactions between the monitoring of institutional 
investors and two governance mechanisms regarding the board: the incentive effect provided by I director ownership, and the supervisory role of non-executive directors. 
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Our analysis shows that institutional ownership is associated with better 
firm performance, and this association is more significant when no other large 
(>5%) shareholding is present. We also find that the presence of institutional 
ownership strengthens the link between executive ownership and perfonnance 
signi cantly when no other large external shareholder is present, or when there is 
a single institutional shareholding higher than the executive ownership. Our 
finding is consistent with the institutional monitoring hypothesis and suggests 
complementarity between institutional investors and executive directors with 
respect to firm performance; it also indicates that institutional monitoring might 
be subject to a free-rider problem and executive pressure. Finally, with regards to 
non-executive directors, we detect no evidence suggesting that institutional 
investors make non-executive directors work more effectively. 
Chapter 5 presents the main conclusion of this work. Generally speaking, 
our work shows that institutional investors can influence the whole corporate 
sector, e. g. in terms of executive compensation and dividend payout. A second 
finding is that institutional investors are far from being a homogeneous group, 
and the general insignificance attained by previous empirical studies is thus partly 
due to pooling the different kinds of institutions. Thirdly, we show the need for 
future studies to consider the complicated ways governance mechanisms interact 
with each other. In particular, we emphasise several promising avenues for future 
research. 
Our work clearly benefits researchers and policy-makers, who will gain 
from our insights about the corporate governance role of financial institutions. 
What may be less obvious is the benefit to the shareholders. The key benefit to 
12 
individual shareholders is probably that our work helps them to understand how 
ownership structure affects a company's financial decisions and performance. 
They could adjust their investments accordingly, e. g., they might turn to 
companies with high dedicated institutional ownership if they believe dedicated 
institutional investors provide good monitoring. On the other hand, institutional 
investors could benefit from our research as well. Knowing that their 
shareholdings can significantly affect investee companies' financial decisions and 
performance, more institutional investors might exert their monitoring on the 
management, hence contribute to better corporate governance and finally, better 
firm performance. 
13 
Chapter 2 
Institutional Investors and Director Pay: An Empirical 
Study of UK Companies 
14 
2.1 Introduction 
Executive compensation has been the subject of extensive prior research. 
Concerns have been expressed about the escalation in executive compensation 
both in the UK and the US because executive pay increases have outstripped rises 
in general earnings and these increases have not always been consistent with the 
underlying perfonnance of finns (Gregg et al., 2004). The objective of this 
chapter is to investigate the role of institutional investors in influencing executive 
director pay in the UK. In doing so., our analysis attempts to provide insights into 
two important questions. First, does financial institutional ownership exert any 
influence on director pay? Second, does institutional ownership make director pay 
more closely linked to firm perfon-nance? 
The existing literature suggests that institutional investors can provide direct 
monitoring and disciplining over managers, which is more difficult for other 
investors who are typically smaller, more passive and less-infon-ned (Del Guercio 
and Hawkins, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003 )). It is argued that institutional 
investors can be more effective monitors because they are subject to lower costs 
because of economics of scale in collecting information (Diamond, 1984) and can 
use various formal and informal mechanisms to influence management (Cubbin 
and Leech, 1983). 
There is a large body of literature examining the role of financial institutions 
in the determination of director pay. However, the results are mixed. For example, 
Cosh and Hughes (1997) show that the presence of major financial institutions 
among owners make no appreciable difference to either the level of pay or the 
sensitivity of pay to perfonnance in the UK. Recently, Ozkan (2006) provides 
15 
evidence that institutional ownership in UK companies has a significant and 
negative impact on CEO compensation. For US companies, Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) find that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive pay increases 
with institutional ownership. 
One of the important aspects of our analysis is to address heterogeneity 
across institutional investors with respect to their investment horizons. Bushee 
(1998) and Wahal. and McConnell (2000) argue that shareholders' investment 
horizons might affect the extent to which corporate managers are effectively 
monitored. Using US data, Shin (2005) provides evidence suggesting that the 
investment horizons of institutional investors influence CEO compensation. We 
classify financial institutions into dedicated (long-horizon) and transient (short- 
horizon) categories using their portfolio turnover in non-financial finns. Financial 
institutions with portfolio turnover in the top 25% (bottom 75%) of the turnover 
distribution are considered to be transient (dedicated) institutional investors with 
little or no conunitment to monitoring and disciplining activities. We expect 
dedicated (transient) institutions to exert more (less) influence on both director 
pay and pay-performance relationship. 
To conduct our analysis, we incorporate information on 563 non-financial 
fimis during the period 2000-2004. Using cash compensation as our dependent 
variable, we find that size and cash holdings are significant in explaining both 
CEO and executive director pay. Institutional investors, as a whole, make no 
appreciable difference in director pay and pay-performance relationship. 
However, there is evidence that dedicated institutional investors not only restrain 
director pay but also strengthen pay-performance relationship in firms where they 
16 
have significant stakes. There is no evidence pointing to a similar impact exerted 
by transient financial investors. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 22.22 provides a 
review of the strand of literature that examines director pay and institutional 
monitoring. In Section 2.3 we describe how we differentiate institutional 
investors. Section 2.4 presents the data and methodology. Section 2.5 presents the 
results and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Director pay, performance and the role of financial institutions 
2.2.1 Director pay 
There is a strand of the literature examining the relationship between director pay 
and corporate perfonnance. It is argued that director pay is an important corporate 
governance tool in resolving the manager-shareholder conflict. Using pay-for- 
perfon-nance pay contracts, shareholders attempt to provide directors with 
incentives that help align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Prior empirical research on the pay-performance link is extensive. Using a 
sample of 1049 US firms during the period 1974-1986, Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) find that a $1000 increase in shareholder wealth leads to a $3.25 increase 
in CEO pay. However., the UK findings do not lead to clear-cut conclusions. 
Conyon and Gregg (1994) and Conyon and Leech (1994) find a weak 
perfonnance-pay link. On the other hand, Main and Bruce (1996) include 
executive options in total compensation and find a more significant relation 
between pay and performance. Recently, using both total board pay and highest 
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director pay for a sample of large UK firms, Gregg et al. (2004) provide evidence 
for a weak relation. Finally, Ozkan (2006) finds that perfonnance has a positive 
but insignificant impact on director pay. 
In addition to performance, there are other factors that shape director pay. It 
is argued that larger firms may employ better-qualified and hence better-paid 
managers. In addition, director ownership may lead to greater managerial 
discretion and hence potentially play an important role in determining director 
pay. Finns with larger cash holdings also tend to reward their directors higher 
cash compensations. Finally, dividend and leverage policies can be used as 
corporate governance mechanisms and hence can be seen as substitutes to 
compensation in alleviating the agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders. 
2.2.2 Institutional monitoring 
It is widely acknowledged that financial institutions differ from individual 
investors because they generally hold larger stakes and manage large pools of 
investment funds (Ozkan, 2006). It is argued that they can be effective monitors Z-- 
as they have cost advantages because of economies of scale and diversification 
(Diamond, 1984). Additionally, large institutional investors can use various 
formal and informal mechanisms such as their voting power, shareholder 
activism, and election of board members to influence management. Large 
institutional investors also have more power and expertise, and act more 
rationally. Therefore, they are more effective than dispersed individual investors 
in influencing the boards (Cubbin and Leech, 1983). However, prior research also 
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points out that monitoring by institutional investors may not be effective as there 
are potential liquidity costs (Coffee, 1991 . Maug, 1998); free-rider problems with 
other shareholders, conflicts of interest and strategy alignment (Pound, 1988). 
Finally, agency problems within the funds themselves might prevent them from 
being effective corporate monitors. 
The evidence on whether institutional investors provide effective 
monitoring is mixed. Parrino et al. (2003) suggests that institutional trading 
influences board decisions whereas there are studies that find no evidence of a 
significant monitoring role exerted by institutional investors (Faccio and Lasfer, 
2000; Renneboog, 2000). 
As large shareholders, financial institutions would be expected to implement 
a pay-setting procedure that would more closely align the interests of managers 
and shareholders. For example, they can do so by strengthening the pay- 
perfon-nance link and/or restraining the level of pay. Cosh and Hughes (1997) 
examine the link between executive pay and firm characteristics in the UK and 
find no appreciable influence of institutional investors. More recently, examining 
the level of CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies, Ozkan 
(2006) finds that institutional ownership has a significant and negative impact on 
CEO compensation. Studying a sample of US firms, Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
find that institutional ownership is positively related to pay-performance 
sensitivity and negatively related to pay. Khan et al. (2004) find that higher level 
of concentration is associated with lower level of pay. 
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2.2.3 Inslitutional investors in UK 
The issue of the determination of executive pay has been a major element in UK 
corporate governance reform. Since Cadbury Report (2006), reforms have 
concentrated on trying to encourage the establishment of pay-setting procedures 
that are transparent, rewarding success and penalising failure. Greenbury Report 
(1995) in particular suggests greater disclosure of executive pay and stronger 
scrutiny over the setting of director pay and emphasizes that incentive pay should 
have strict performance criteria. The Directors Remuneration Report Regulation 
M02 is now in force,, requiring the directors of a company to prepare a pay report 
that is expected to be "clear, transparent and understandable to shareholders". 
One of the significant changes in relation to the rights of institutional shareholders 
came in 2003 when shareholders were given the right to vote on executive deals 
at annual meetings. This has undoubtedly led to greater accountability of 
companies to their shareholders and facilitated the role for shareholders in 
approving pay packages. Additionally., the presence of institutional investors in 
the UK is significant. Around 80% of UK equity is held by financial institutions, 
primarily by insurance companies (17.2%), pension funds (15.7%) and overseas 
investors (32.6%) (ONSý 2004). Also, the concentration of share voting in 
institutional hands and the more widely spread use of proxy voting encourages 
more institutions' participation in the corporate governance system. 
2.3 Which institutions matter? 
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2.3.1 Theoretical and empirical background 
A frequently expressed concern is that institutional investors systematically adopt 
a time horizon that is too short to make them an effective monitor. Institutions can 
affect compensation through investing and trading decisions as well as direct 
involvement. Prior research highlights the choices that institutions face between 
exerting monitoring effort for shared gain versus simply trading for private gain 
(Maug, 1998). Whether institutional investors undertake monitoring is determined 
by the trade-off between the benefits of monitoring and its costs to institutional 
investors. Monitoring costs arise from activities in gathering firm-specific 
information and building a relationship with the management. We hypothesize 
that long-ten-n institutions with significant ownership in firms are more likely to 
exert monitoring and influencing efforts in firms rather than trading. 
2.3.2 Classification offinancial institutions 
To examine the ability and incentives of institutional investors to monitor, we 
explore institutions' investment horizons. Since institutions may build a 
reputation as long-term investors and hence be able to credibly signal to company 
management their intent to hold for long-term, we base the measure of investment 
horizons on the expected, rather than actual, holding period for an institutional 
stake in a firm. Expected holding period can be reasonably inferred from an 
institution's portfolio tun-lover level. In line with Bushee (1998), we classify all 
institutions that hold significant shares in listed non-financial companies into two 
groups: (1) "transient" institutions, which buy and sell their investments more 
I frequently and exhibit a high portfolio turnover; (2) "dedicated" institutions, 
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which have their positions unchanged for a considerable length of time and have a 
low portfolio turnover. 
We calculate portfolio turnover for each institutional investor. Following 
Wahal and McConnell (2000), we measure investors' portfolio turnover using 
publicly available information from 2003 and 2004. It is measured as the total 
market value of shares traded in non-financial listed firms where they have 
significant stakes (>3%) during the year t divided by the total market value of its 
portfolio in these finns at the end of the year t-1. We calculate the institutional 
turnover for year 2003 and 2004 separately and then take the average value using 
the following formula: 
N 
I ýShr,,, AvgP, - Shr,.,., -, 
AvgP,, 
PortTu. rn,, -N 
Shý,,,, A vgP, 
where Shrij, is the number of shares owned by institution j in firmi at the end of 
year t, AvgPjt is the average price for stock i at year t. N is the number of firms L- 
where institution j has significant stakes. We use AvgPit in both numerator and 
denominator to smooth out extreme movements in equity prices. 
We obtain the trading record and ownership of 1802 institutional investors. 
We find that the turnover of institutions in UK is quite low with an average 
turnover of 0.04. In other words, every year an average institution trades (i. e., 
purchases or sells) only 4% of their stakes in non-financial listed firnis. Moreover, 
we observe that out of 1802 institutions, only 561 institutions traded in non- 
I? I? 
financial listed firms in year 2003 and 2004. We classify these institutions as: (1) 
transient institutions if their portfolio turnover lies in the top -15% of the turnover 
distribution; and (2) dedicated institutions otherwise. We identify 1354 dedicated 
institutions and 448 transient institutions. 
2.4 Empirical model, data and methodology 
2.4.1 Model and hypotheses 
We expect that the presence of financial institutions and their trading behavior 
influence the detennination of director pay and the relationship between pay and 
performance. We predict that dedicated institutions restrain director pay and make 
the pay-performance link stronger. In testing these predictions we model 
institutional monitoring as a governance mechanism that restricts the level of 
director pay. Our main explanatory variable is institutional ownership 
concentration defined as the sum of all significant financial institutional 
shareholdings in the firm greater than 3%. 
Our baseline model considers only the direct impact of performance and 
institutional ownership on director pay. To test whether institutional holdings 
affect the pay-perforniance link we interact institutional holdings and firm 
performance, allowing us to test if the impact of performance on director pay 
depends on the level of institutional ownership. lf institutional investors restrain 
director pay then we expect the estimated coefficient of institutional ownership to 
be negative. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is 
expected to be positive if institutional investors provide monitoring to make pay 
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more sensitive to performance. We repeat the same analysis by grouping financial 
institutions on the basis of their portfolio turnover. 
In conducting our analysis we carefully consider the issue of endogeneity. 
We estimate our model using the average values, except the dependent variable, 
in an attempt to mitigate problems that might arise due to short-term fluctuations 
and extreme values. We measure director pay in 2004, and the explanatory 
variables over the period 2000-2003. Using past values reduces the likelihood of 
observed relations reflecting the effects of director pay on other finn-specific 
factors including institutional ownership and perforniance. 
2.4.2 Dependent variable-dire ctors 'pay 
Murphy (1999) draws a distinction between cash pay, which includes base salary 
and annual bonus, and total pay, which also includes incentive components such 
as stock options and long-tenn incentive plans. The salary plus bonus pay 
measure has been widely used in prior research (Jensen and Murphy, 1990, 
Conyon and Gregg, 1994), while recently researchers also include share options 
(Ozkan, 2006; Ozkan, 2007). In this chapter, we consider only cash based 
compensation and do not include either option grants or other non-cash pay items. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the quality of disclosure of details of 
executive pay has been highly uneven, so collecting uniformly complete and 
reliable data across large sets of companies is often hampered. Second, Murphy 
(1999) demonstrates that existing attempts to value executive stock options have 
obvious shortcomings. Finally, there has been a tendency for director pay to 
become increasingly complicated, in terms of the number of pay components and 
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the complexity of each. Even where poor disclosure and cross-fin-ns heterogeneity 
are not a problem, there are still concerns relating to the valuation of certain pay 
elements, such as the long-tenn incentive plans which partially replaced executiN, e 
options in the second half of 1990s. 
It should be noted that the exclusion of non-cash items in total 
compensation is a potential weakness. However, we do not expect the main 
conclusions of our analysis to change significantly as a result of the exclusion of 
non-cash compensation. This is because it is reported in Ozkan (2006) that cash 
pay constitutes about 70% of total compensation for UK CEOs. Also, the same 
study finds a significant relation between pay and institutional ownership only 
when compensation is defined in terms of cash pay. 
2.4.3 Independent variables 
We use Tobin's Q as our performance measure. We also include in our analysis a 
set of corporate governance and control variables. Besides institutional 
ownership, we use two other variables to control for ownership structure, namely 
CEO ownership and the shareholdings of all executive directors. In addition, we 
include control variables such as size, leverage, cash flow and dividend. Finally, 
industry dun-m-iies are included to control for pay similarities within industries and 
preferences institutional investors have for particular industries. Definitions for 
the variables used in the analysis are given in Table 2.1. 
- Insert Table 2.1 Here - 
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2.4.4 Data description 
For our empirical analysis, we use a sample of publicly traded firms over the 
period 2000-2004. We obtain information from two different sources. 
Information on fin-n's ownership and director pay is derived from the Hemscott 
Guru Academic Database, which provides detailed infom-iation on all directors of 
UK listed companies, and trading record for all large shareholders. The data for 
accounting variables and the market value of equity come from Datastream 
database. 
Our initial sample is the set of all firnis for which data are available on both 
Hemscott and Datastream. The final sample has been constructed as follows. 
First, we exclude financial firnis. Second, fim-is are dropped if the data for any 
independent variable is missing. These criteria provide us with a total of 563 
fimis, with at least one pay variable: CEO pay and/or executive average pay. 
Among 563 firms, we only have 529 observations for CEO pay since 34 firms do 
not have a CEO. There are 546 observations for the executive average pay. Not 
every executive director's pay is available from Hemscott and the average pay is 
considered to be imavailable even if one member's pay data is missing. This 
explains why the number of observations drops from 563 to 546 for executive 
average pay. 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of descriptive statistics. It reveals that the 
average value of Tobin's Q is 1.68 (median 1.28), and the logarithm of total assets 
is 11.74 (median 10.81). For director ownership, the average CEO ownership is 
4.98% (median 0.36%) and the average executive ownership is 10.47% (median 
.. 88%). As 
for institutional ownership, the mean value of institutional ownership I 
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is 30.34% (median 29.02%), while the average dedicated institutional ownership 
is 16.27% (median 12.88%), and the average transient institutional ownership is 
14.06% (median 11.63%). We also observe that the average values of cash 
holdings, cash dividend payouts and leverage are respectively 19%, 2% and 2-': )% 
(the corresponding median values are 11 %, 1% and 14%). Finally, the average 
(median) CEO cash pay (i. e. base salary plus cash bonus) is f285,000 (f213,000) 
whereas the average (median) cash pay for executive director is f226,000 
(f 198,000). These values are smaller than the corresponding values in Ozkan 
(2006) that also include financial fim-is in the sample. Clearly, financial firms are 
typically larger and managers in such firms attain higher pay. 
- Insert Table 2.2 here - 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Univariate analysis 
In this section, we report univariate mean-comparison test results of the sample 
subgroups categorized on the basis of above and below median values for 
perfom-lance, ownership structure and other fimi characteristics. Using a t-test, we 
test the hypotheses that firms with above median values of these characteristics 
differ from firnis with below median values with respect to director pay. We find 
that firnis with above median performance have logarithm CEO pay (executive 
average pay) of 12-23 (12.10), and those with below median performance have 
logarithm CEO pay (executive average pay) of 12.17 (12.00). These differences 
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are statistically significant at the 10% level. The results for size, dividend. 
institutional holdings, transient institutional ownership, and the ratio of dedicated 
institutional ownership to total institutional ownership are also found to be 
statistically significant. Specifically, finns with above median value of size, 
dividend payouts, total institutional ownership and transient institutional 
ownership have higher pay levels. There is also evidence that finns with above 
median values of CEO/executive ownershiP and the dedicated institutional 
ownership ratio seem to have lower pay levels. The results are generally in line 
with our expectations and support our prediction that the presence of transient 
institutional investors does not lead to lower director pay level (Table 2-3). 
- Insert Table 2.3 here - 
2.5.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we provide a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the 
relationship between director pay and several firm-specific characteristics by 
focusing on the impact of institutional ownership on director pay. As explained 
earlier, in doing so we consider two important aspects. First, we test whether 
institutional ownership exerts any impact in determining the level of director pay. 
Second, we examine whether the relation between pay and performance depends 
on institutional ownership and the type of institutional shareholders. 
The results presented in Table 2.4 relate to the level of CEO cash pay and 
are based on a cross sectional regression approach. We start by estimating our 
baseline model (Model 1). In general, the estimated coefficients are in line with 
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the hypothesized signs and the existing findings in the literature. Specifically, the 
results reveal that there is a positive and significant relation between perforinance 
and compensation. Additionally, larger finns and firnis with greater liquid assets 
seem to pay their CEOs more. 
- Insert Table 2.4 here - 
Surprisingly, we do not find any significant influence exerted on the level of 
pay by CEO ownership, dividend payout and leverage. The insignificant impact 
of CEO ownership on pay may be due to the possibility that directors are awarded 
with more stocks or stock options instead of cash and director ownership is 
therefore more likely to be positively related to long-term pay rather than cash 
compensation. In Model (2), we also add institutional ownership aiiiontc--),, 
explanatory variables where no differentiation is made among institutional 
investors. Moreover, we interact it with the perfonnance variable, Tobin's Q, to 
test if the impact of performance on pay varies with the level of institutional 
shareholdings. The results do not provide any significant relation between pay 
and institutional ownership. Furthennore, the interaction effect is also 
insignificalit. 
These findings possibly suggest that total institutional ownership does not 
play an important role in detemlining director pay. Our findings are in line with 
Cosh and Hughes (1997), who find that institutions as major shareholders make 
no appreciable difference to either the level of pay or its relationship to firm 
performance. However, Ozkan (2006) reports that there is a negative and 
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significant relation between director pay and institutional ownership. As 
mentioned earlier, Ozkan's (2006) sample consists of larger firms and its findings 
may reflect the fact that larger firms are more likely to receive attention from 
financial institutions. In fact, when we consider only large firms (above median 
size firms) in the analysis we obtain similar results. Also, we have additional 
control variables such as dividend and leverage, which may play important 
governance roles in monitoring and disciplining managers. Last but not least, our 
analysis controls for endogeneity by adopting an average cross-sectional analysis 
whereas in Ozkan's (2006) only data for I year is incorporated in the empirical 
model. 
We next test whether the impact of institutional ownership on director pay is 
associated with investment horizon by splitting financial institutions into 
"dedicated" and "transient" institutions. We expect that dedicated institutions, 
potentially with longer investment horizons, and hence lower monitoring costs 
and higher monitoring benefits, would exert more governance influence. As a 
result, they would restrain director pay and strengthen pay-performance 
relationship. The results of this exercise are reported in Model (3) of Table 2.4. 
The results regarding other fin-n-specific characteristics are somewhat different 
from those reported in Models (1) and (2) where no differentiation is made 
amongst institutional ownership. Specifically, although size and cash are still 
positively and significantly related to pay, performance does not seem to exert 
any significant influence on director pay. Moreover, the impact of leverage on 
director pay is now significantly negative. More interestingly, the results reveal 
that the ownership by dedicated institutions restrains cash compensation to CEOs. 
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The estimated coefficient of dedicated institutional ownership, INSTD, is 
negative and significant. Additionally, there is strong evidence that the pay- 
performance relationship is also impacted by the level of dedicated ownership. 
That is, the sensitivity of director pay to firm performance is stronger at higher 
levels of dedicated institutional ownership. That is, dedicated institutional 
investors enhance pay-perfonnance relationship. 
The findings regarding transient institutional ownership are mixed. 
Although we observe a significant positive relation between transient institutional 
ownership and director pay, there is no significant impact of transient institutions 
on pay-performance relationship. This possibly points to the passiveness of 
transient institutional investors., increasing managerial discretion which in turn 
leads to higher director pay. 
In general, our findings so far suggest that institutional investors' 
investment horizons matter in disciplining director pay. Although total 
institutional ownership does not seem to affect director pay significantly, 
dedicated institutions restrain director pay while there is an opposite effect of 
transient institutional ownership on the level of cash compensation. Finally, in 
Model (4) we replace dedicated and transient institutional ownership variables 
with a new variable, DE_RATIO, which measures the relevance importance of 
dedicated institutional ownership with respect to total institutional ownership. The 
DE-RATIO is defined as the ratio of dedicated institutional ownership to total 
institutional ownership and is expected to capture more precisely the influence of 
dedicated institutional investors in the presence of other institutional owners. The 
findings are in support of our predictions and earlier findings. Specifically, it 
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seems that as the relative importance of dedicated ownership decreases the level 
of director pay, providing support for the view that dedicated institutions are 
better monitors than other institutional owners with shorter investment horizons. 
Additionally, there is strong evidence that director pay becomes more sensitive to 
firm performance in the presence of strong dedicated institutional investors. 
In Table 2.5 we present new regression results using an alternative 
definition for cash compensation. Specifically, instead of using only CEO cash 
compensation as our dependent variable, we incorporate the logarithm of average 
cash pay to all executive directors including CEOs. In general, the results are very 
similar to those reported in Table 2.4. That is, size and cash remain as the main 
firm characteristics affecting significantly cash compensation of directors. 
Ownership by executive directors does not exert significant influence on the level 
of executive pay. Also, rather surprisingly, pay-perforniance relationship is not 
always significant. The results suggest that in firms with greater dividend payouts 
to shareholders cash compensation to executive managers are significantly larger. 
Although this is not supported by earlier findings, the positive coefficient of 
dividend payouts may suggest that dividends can be a signal for the future 
prospects of firms where better prospects lead to higher compensation. 
- Insert Table 2.5 here - 
Although the direct effect of dedicated institutional ownership is not 
siGnificant in deten-nining executive cash compensation, the ratio of dedicated r> 
ownership to total institutional ownership is found to be negatively related to 
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director pay. Also, its indirect (conditional) effect on total executive pay through 
pay-perfon-nance relationship seems to be important. The results suggest that 
executive directors pay becomes more sensitive to firm perfon-nance at higher 
levels of dedicated ownership (Model 3). More specifically, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction ten'n between pay and dedicated ownership is 
positive and significant. This indicates that executive directors pay is more 
closely linked to performance when dedicated institutional ownership is greater. 
However, these findings are not supported when we replace the institutional 
ownership variables with the ratio of dedicated ownership to total institutional 
ownership (Model 4). 
2.5.3 Robustness checks 
We have carried out several robustness checks. First, using total institutional 
ownership, we split the sample into high and low institutional ownership firms 
and we re-estimate our basic model for the two sub-samples separately. There is 
some evidence suggesting a link between pay and performance when the total 
institutional ownership is higher than the median. Additionally, we split the 
sample using dedicated institutional ownership and repeat the above exercise. We 
find strong evidence that the relationship between pay and performance is 
positive and significant only for finns in the high-dedicated institutional 
ownership sample. In line with our earlier interpretation, this finding provides 
further evidence for the view that pay-perfotmance relationship is stronger in 
finns with institutional investors who have interests in monitoring managers. 
Finally, we split the sample using transient institutional ownership. The 
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coefficient of perforn-iance remains insignificant throughout all regressions using 
both definitions of cash compensation. Consistent with our earlier analysis, there 
is no evidence suggesting that transient institutional ownership affects pay- 
performance relationship. 
The robustness tests we have conducted above provide further support for 
our earlier findings. Specifically, the dedicated institutional investors strengthen 
pay-perfom-iance link in finns where they have significant stakes (>3%), while 
transient institutional investors do not have a significant impact on pay- 
performance relationship. 
Finally, we incorporate alternative perfonnance measures in the analysis. 
Instead of using Tobin's Q as our perfom-lance indicator we also consider return 
on assets (ROA). The results remain very similar to the results we obtain using 
Tobin's Q and hence are not reported separately. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the role of institutional investors in determining 
director pay in publicly listed non-financial UK companies. The focus has been 
on the distinction between institutional shareholders regarding their investment 
horizons. We have investigated whether institutional investors, in particular 
dedicated ones, impact the level of director pay and influence pay-performance 
relation. To do so, we have adopted an average cross-sectional analysis in an 
attempt to control for endogeneity and the effects of extreme short-term changes 
in the main variables of interest. 
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Our findings suggest that fin-n size and cash holdings exert a positive and 
significant influence on executive director pay. However, other firm-specific 
characteristics such as leverage and dividend payout do not seem to have a 
significant impact on director pay. No sufficient evidence was found to support 
the hypothesis that institutional investors as a whole constrain director pay and 
strengthen pay-performance relation, supporting to some extent the argument that 
institutional investors in the UK are passive and ineffective in monitoring. 
However, when we split the institutions according to their trading characteristics 
we are able to provide evidence suggesting a positive role that dedicated 
institutional investors with long investment horizons can play. We find that 
dedicated institutional ownership not only restrains the director pay level, but also 
strengthens pay-performance relationship in firms where they have significant 
stakes. This finding is consistent with our expectation that dedicated institutions 
are more involved in corporate governance and serve a better disciplining role 
than other institutional investors with short investment horizons. 
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Table 2.1 
Variables, definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition and Source 
Dependent Variables 
CEOP Chief executive director's (CEO) cash pay (Hemseott) 
EX-AP Average cash pay of all executive directors, including CEO (Hemscoto 
LNCEOP The logarithm of CEO cash pay (Our own calculcition) 
The logarithm of average cash pay of all executive directors, including 
LNEX-AP CEO (Our own calculation) 
Independent Variables 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity to book value of total asset (Our own 
Tobin's Q calculation) 
CEO-OWN (%) The percentage of equity ownership owned by CEO (Hemscott) 
The percentage of equity ownership owned by executive directors 
EX-OWN (Hemscott) 
INSTT The sum of institutional shareholdings greater than 3% (Hemscott) 
The sum of shareholdings greater than 3% held by dedicated institutions 
INSTD (Our own calculation) 
The sum of shareholdings greater than 3% held by transient institutions 
INSTA (Our own calculation) 
The ratio of dedicated institutional ownership over total institutional 
DE-RATIO ownership (Our ccilculation) 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets (Datastream) 
CASH The ratio of total cash and equivalent items to total assets (Datastreani) 
DIV The ratio of total cash dividend to total assets (Datastream) 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets (Datctstreaný 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics for director pay, performance, ownership structure and control 
variables of the final sample used in our study. 
Variable Mean Min Median Max S. D. 
Director Pay 
CEOP (1000's) 285 5 213 5000 286 
EX-AP(I 000's) 226 5 198 901 21- 
Performance 
Tobin's Q 1.68 0.19 1.28 14.32 1.40 
Ownership 
CEO-0" 4.98 0 0.36 58.53 9.97 
EX-OWN (%) 10.47 0 2.88 74.53 15.16 
fNSTT (%) 30.34 0 2 9.02 84.33 18.07 
tNSTD 16.27 0 12.88 73.57 13.58 
INSTA 14.06 0 11.63 67.45 12.11 
DE-RATIO 0.54 0 0.53 1 0.29 
Control Variables 
SIZE 11.74 6.07 10.81 16.78 1.77 
CASH 0.19 0 0.11 1 0.21 
DIV 0.02 0 0.01 0.41 0.04 
LEV 0.23 0 0.14 2.74 0.51 
The sample size is 563 fin-ns for the fiscal year 2004. We measure director pay (the 
dependent variable) in 2004, and the explanatory variables over the period 2003 to 2000. 
However, for institutional ownership data is available only for two years, 2003 and 2002. 
Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. 
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Table 2.3 
Univariate Results 
PaneIA PaneIB 
CEO Pay mean Executive Average Pay mean 
T-test T-test 
Above Below (mean Above Below (mean 
variable variable compensati variable variable compensati 
median median on) median median on) 
Performance 
Tobin's Q 12.23 12.17 0.79 12.10 12.00 1.73* 
Ownership 
CEO-0" 12.06 12.36 -3.83 
EX-0" 11.90 12.18 -5.27* 
INSTT 12.31 12.09 2.75* 12.15 11.95 3.65* 
fNSTD 12.19 1, -)., ýo -0.08 12.06 12.04 0.36 
INSTA 12.38 12.02 4.92* 1ý. 22 2 11.87 6.58* 
DE-RATIO 12.03 12.41 -4.92* 11.92 12.,? 0 -5.23* 
Control Variables 
SIZE 12.58 11.80 11.29* 12.42 11.66 16.66* 
CASH 12.21 12.18 0.43 12.02 12.06 -0.75 
DIV 12.46 11.94 6.99* 12.23 11.86 6.98* 
LEV 12.16 12.24 -1.09 12.03 12.06 -0.51 
This table presents mean comparisons of director pay- analyzing high (above median) 
versus low (below median) performance, ownership structure and other finn 
characteristics such as size, cash holding, dividend and leverage. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 1. * Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.4 
Cross-sectional CEO pay regressions on perfon-nance, institutional ownership (and 
interaction item between them), and other firm characteristics 
Dependent Variable: LNCEOP 
Independent 
Variables Predicted Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
16 Tobin's Q+0.054** 0.054 -0.042 -0.0" 
(0.14) (-0.79) (-0.60) 
CEO-O'WN -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
(-1.23) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-1.16) 
fNSTT -0.001 
(-0.27) 
Q*fNSTT + 0.001 
(0.85) 
fNSTD -0.011*** 
(-2.75) 
Q*INSTD + 0.005*** 
(2.60) 
fNSTA 0.009** 
(2.46) 
Q*INSTA + -0.001 
(-0.95) 
DE-RATIO -0.322*** 
(-2.70) 
Q* DE- 
RATIO + 0.122** 
(2.31) 
SIZE + 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.243*** 0.237*** 
(9.62) (9.37) (8.89) (8.26) 
CASH + 0.572*** 0.562*** 0.619*** 0.577*** 
(2.75) (2.70) (2.96) (2.72) 
DIV 1.522 1.532 1.331 1.330 
(1.27) (1.28) (1.14) (1.11) 
LEV -0.074 -0.073 -0.088** -0.083 
(-1.60) (-1.55) (-2.18) (-1.35) 
R2 25 02 0.27 0.27 0.25 
R2 0.22 0.24 14 0. ý 0.22 
Model I is the baseline model while model 2,3.4 add different ownership and 
performance interaction items. This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting 
CEO. All regressions include industry dummy variables. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. and * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 
Cross-sectional executive pay regressions on performance, institutional ownership (and 
interaction item between them), and other firm characteristics 
Dependent Variable: LNEX-AP 
Independent 
Variables Predicted Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Tobin's Q + 0.052*** 0.024 -0.001 0.015 
(3.59) (0.69) (-0.02) (0.43) 
EXE-OWN -0.002* -0.002 -0.035 -0.001 
(-1.73) (-1.23) (-1.50) (-1.02) 
INSTT 0.001 
(0.41) 
Q*INSTT + 0.001 
(0.75) 
INSTI) -0.005 
(-1.60) 
Q*fNSTD + 0.003** 
(2.08) 
INSTA 0.008*** 
(3.43) 
Q*INSTA + -0.001 
(-0.76) 
DE-RATIO -0.232*** 
(2 ,. 78) 
Q* DE- 
RATIO 0.057 
SIZE + 0.246*** 0.244*** 0.237*** 0.239*** 
(12.89) (12.74) (12.48) (12.06) 
CASH + 0.283* 0.278* 0.306** 0.286* 
(1.95) (1.88) (2.08) (1.91) 
DIV 1.319** 1.332** 1.185** 1.190* 
(2.08) (2.12) (2.02) (1.93) 
LEV -0.029 -0.028 -0.035 -0.022 
(-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.50) (-0.52) 
R 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.45 
R2 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 
Model I is the baseline model while model 2,3,4 add different ownership and 
performance interaction items. This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting 
executive pay. All regressions include industry dummy variables. T-statistic values are 
reported in parentheses. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. and 
indicates significance at I %ý 5% and 10% level, respectively 
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Chapter 3 
Control Structure and Dividend Policy: An Empirical 
Investigation Using UK Panel Data 
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3.1 Introduction 
The issue of dividend is a bit of puzzle in the theory of finns. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) argue that, under the restrictive conditions of perfect capital 
markets, any mix of retained earnings and payout will not affect firm value. 
Moreover, dividends are taxable to many investors, while firms can reduce taxes 
by holding and re-investing their profits. However, this has proven to be fittile as 
in the majority of the cases investors do demand some type of a dividend payment 
("the dividend puzzle", Black, 1976). There have been several explanations for 
this puzzle. From the agency perspective, dividend asserts cash payment to 
shareholders and hence helps to reduce agency problems, either by eliminating 
the free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) or by increasing the frequency of external 
capital raising and associated monitoring by investment bankers and invertors 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Hence the divided payment may be a bonding mechanism 
pre-committing managers to pursue value maximisation. Moreover, information 
asynuiietries between firms and outside investors can lead to a signalling role for 
a dividend: managers have superior inforniation about the firm than outsider 
investors,, and they can use a dividend to "signal" the well-being of the fim. 
The interaction of dividend policy and control structure has recently gained 
a great deal of attention in academic research. Shareholders who control firms 
usually impose their preferred payout ratios on all the shareholders; there has 
been evidence that strong shareholders actively pursue specific payout outcomes 
(Allen et al., 2000; Gulger, 2003). In addition, whether s firm's dividend policy is 
effective in reducing agency costs and infon-nation asymmetry may depend on the rý 
fiiin"s control structure. Given that strong shareholders exert their control power. 
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there may be no need for the dividend policy to constitute an additional 
monitoring or signalling device (La Porta et al., 2000; Goergen et al.. 2004). 
There are also a few empirical studies focusing on the relationship between 
dividend payout and control structure. For German firms, Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) document that the dividend payout ratio and the extent of dividend 
smoothing decrease with the power of the largest shareholder. Mohd et al. (1995) 
find that, in the US, more dispersed ownership results in higher payout ratios. 
Using UK data, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) find that the presence of 
strong block holders or a block holder coalition lower payout level and 
considerably weakens the relationship between corporate earnings and payout 
dynamics. The identity of the block shareholder also affects the payout ratios. For 
example, Moh'd et al. (1995) document that larger managerial ownership 
translates into lower dividend payout ratios, while larger institutional stakes are 
associated with higher payout. Using UK data, Short et al. (2002) obtain a similar 
result. 
The shareholder-oriented governance regime of the UK is a natural choice 
for an investigation of this issue. The UK stands apart from other OECD countries 
in two key respects: first of all, the majority of firms in the UK pay dividends, and 
these dividend yields are unusually high and considered to be downwardly 
inflexible; secondly, the rate of share ownership by financial institutions is higher 
(Khan, 2006; Da Silva, 2006). Institutional investors collectively own around 80 
percent of market shares (National Statistics, 2007). In this situation, attention has 
focused on the alleged role of institutional investors in forcing firms to maintain 
high dividends, particularly in the face of falling profits in the UK recession of 
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the late 1980s/early 1990s (Short et al.. 2002). In October 2002, Michael 
McLintock, the chief executive of M&G (a part of Prudential, one of the most 
important institutional investors in the UK), wrote a letter to the major UK 
companies about the importance of maintaining dividends despite shrinking 
profits (FT, 2002). Besides the largest voting block, that of institutional investors. 
the second most important category of shareholder in the UK is the directors 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). This raises an interesting question: do the 
dividend patterns reflect the ownership and control structures? One key to 
understanding dividend policy in the UK is, therefore, to identify the controlling 
shareholders. The hypotheses addressed in this chapter draw on the idea that 
dividends and shareholder control act as alternative monitoring and signalling 
devices. Therefore, different forms of shareholder control may give rise to the 
setting of different dividend policies. 
Using a UK dataset from 2000 to 2006, the primary objective of this study is 
to investigate whether any systematic relationship exists between the dividend 
choices of the UK firms and their controlling shareholders. Our study contributes 
to the literature on dividend policy in several areas: firstly, this chapter re-opens 
the debate on the substitutability of dividend and shareholder control in mitigating 
agency cost and infon-liation asymmetry. We group the ownership data in a way 
that reflects the different control categories of owners and hypothesise that the 
inclination to pay dividend and smooth dividend depends on the identity of the 
controlling shareholder coalition. For finns controlled by director-owners and 
individuals, there are neither major conflicts of interest nor large infom-iation 
symmetry between management and the owners (Gulger, 2003). As such, 
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dividend stability is less valuable and management is more likely to adjust 
dividend when necessary. In contrast, firms controlled by financial institutions 
face greater agency costs and information asymmetry; management thus has a 
stronger incentive to use dividend as a monitoring and signalling device. In 
addition, due to the need of some financial institutions for regular dividend 
income., their invested firms are likely to be dividend payers, paying relatively 
smoothed but not low dividends (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2007; Relu-lebooa Z-- 
and Szilagyi, 2007). 
Secondly, we employ two multivariate analyses to investiCrate how dividend rý 
behaviour is affected by the controlling shareholders. In the first stage, following 
Benito and Young (2001), we explain the likelihood that a firni pays dividend 
using random effect Probit models. Consistent with Benito and Young (200 1), Hu 
and Kumar (2004) and Ferris et al. (2006), our results suggest three fundamentals 
that affect the decision to pay dividend in the UK: earning, size and growth 
potential. Larger fin-ns with higher earning income but fewer growth 
opportunities are more likely to be dividend payers. However, unexpectedly, there 
is no evidence to suggest that firnis controlled by institutional investors are more 
likely to pay dividends. In the second stage, we use partial adjustment models 
(PAM) to explain the dynamics of dividend change. We find that institution- 
controlled firms engage in dividend smoothing, while firms controlled by 
director-owners and other individuals are found to be flexible dividend payers and 
make payout decisions based on current earnings rather than historical dividend 
levels. 
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In addition, we explicitly consider the endogeneity problem in the empirical 
analysis of dividend payout. The endogeneity issue is important in this context 
for two reasons: first, it is highly likely that observable and unobservable shocks 
affecting dividend payout can also affect some of the firm-specific characteristics 
such as earning and leverage; second, it is also possible that observed relations 
between dividend and potential detenninants reflect the effects of dividend on the 
latter, rather than vice-versa. To control for the endogeneity, we employ a panel 
data analysis combined with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation procedure. Specifically, we apply a GMM-in-systern estimation, which 
includes lagged differences of the dependent variables as instruments for the 
equations in levels, in addition to using levels as instruments for the differences. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows; Section 3.2 highlights 
some theoretical and empirical background about dividend policy; Section 3.3 
develops our hypotheses based on the key features of the ownership structure in 
the UK; Section 3.4 describes the data; Sections 3.5 and 3.6 detail the 
econometric methodology, as well as presenting key results and possible 
exPlanations in light of existing theory and evidence; and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Theoretical background 
Until recently there was a great deal of talk about the impending death of 
dividends (Faina and French, 2001). However, a confluence of events has 
conspired to make bosses and investors think again. Investors have grown more 
sceptical about accounting profits in the wake of Enron and WorldCom and now 
require evidence of profitability in the form of a dividend check. Furthermore, 
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some big firms, specifically technology firms, have piled up so much cash that it 
seems to bum a hole in their pockets (Economist, 2004 14 ). In this section we 
review various theories stipulating that factors such as agency cost, infonnation 
asymmetries and taxes determine a firm's payout decision. 
3.3.1 Agency cost 
Our chapter takes an agency perspective as a starting point for explaining 
dividend policy. A key source of agency conflicts stems from a firm's policy in 
dividing profit between dividend and retained earning. Directors , interests may 
not be perfectly aligned to the interests of shareholders, as their corporate 
objective may be growth rather than value. Jensen (1986) argues that dividend 
payments help to dissipate cash, which might otherwise be wasted in non-value 
maximising projects, therefore reducing the extent of over-investment by 
directors. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) present a model of firm valuation where the 
payment of dividends serves to reduce agency costs. Born and Rimbey (1993) 
also suggest that high dividend is used as a self-disciplining mechanism. Higher 
dividend payout increases the likelihood that the firm will have to sell common 
stock in primary capital markets, which in turn leads to an investigation of 
management by capital suppliers (Easterbrook, 1984). Recent theoretical work by 
Fluck (1999) also presents agency-theoretical models of dividend behaviour 
where directors pay dividends in order to avoid disciplining action by 
shareholders. 
14 Issue July 22th, 2004. Microsoft's dividend - Bill's millions. 
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3.3.2 Information Asymmetry 
Signalling theories of dividend relax the assumption of symmetry information 
between investors and directors. Information asymmetry between firms and 
outside investors can lead to a signalling role for dividends: directors have 
superior infom-iation about the firm than outsider investors, and they can use 
dividend to "signal" the well-being of the firm and promote confidence (Ross, 
1977; Miller and Rock, 1985). Lintner (1956) makes the observation that 
directors are particularly concerned with the stability of dividend because they 
strongly believe that the market puts a premium on firms with a stable dividend 
policy. Asymmetry of information allows directors to smooth dividend and they 
have a strong incentive to do so since: (1) a steady flow of dividend may suffice 
to convince external shareholders that the company is performing well; and (2) a 
dividend cut will trigger adverse market reaction. This is further supported by a 
recent survey carried out by Brav et al. (2005), which finds extreme reluctance on 
the part of the management to cut dividends; 90% of firms strongly agreed that 
they smooth dividends from year to year. 
3.3.3 Tax 
In their intriguing study, "Disappearing dividends: changing finn characteristics C5 
or lower propensity to pay", Fama and French (2001) document a large decline 
over the period 1978-1998 in the number and percentage of industrial firms that 
paid dividend. Unlike the US, firms in the UK do not demonstrate a decreasing 
propensity to distribute funds to shareholders (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 
2007). The tax code effect might partly account for the discrepancies in payout 
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between UK and US firms. The US has a classical company tax system whereby 
dividends are taxed twice: the first time on the corporate level (via corporate tax), 
and a second time on the shareholder level (via income tax). In contrast, the UK 
has used a partial imputation system since 1973, in which part of the corporation 
tax is taken into account when calculating a shareholder's liability to income tax 
on company dividend (Short et al., 2002). Hence the tax treatment of dividend is 
more favourable than a classical system. Another particular feature of the UK 
imputation was that, -until July 1997, tax-exempt investors (mainly pension funds, 
but also charities) could claim a full cash refund from the tax authorities. This has 
created a strong preference for earnings to be paid in dividends rather than to be 
retained in the company (Bond et al., 1996). However, there has been a 
substantial change to the taxation of corporate income source, with tax credits on 
dividend payments to pension funds being abolished in July 1997 and Advanced 
Corporation Tax (ACT) ending in April 1999. Consequently, the valuation of the 
dividend income for tax-exempt investors was sharply reduced, leaving them 
indifferent about the choice between dividends and retained earnings (Bell and 
Jelikinson, 2002). 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
3.3.1 Shareholders and dividend policy 
The extent to which the dividend policy is effective in reducing the expected 
agency costs and information asymmetry may depend on the firm's ownership 
and control structure. In what follows, we discuss the plausible effects of the two 
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most important shareholders categories in the UK (i. e. the financial institutions 
and the directors) on dividend policy. 
3.3.1.1. Director-owners 
Agency theory suggests that management is reluctant to pay dividends, preferring 
instead to retain resources under their control. In an agency context, directorial 
ownership can be used as a proxy for the aligment of interests between directors 
and shareholders. However, the relation between dividend payout ratio and 
directorial ownershi could be non-monotonic (Schooley and Barney, 1994; pi 
Farinha, 2003). At a lower level, a directorial stake helps to align the interests of 
management and shareholders (Jensen et al., 1992), dividend policy thus becomes 
less desirable as a discipline and motivation tool. At a higher level of directorial 
ownership, inside ownership increase is associated with additional, entrenchment- 
related agency cost (Morck et al., 1988), and as such the scrutiny placed on the 
firm by a higher dividend becomes necessary again. Eventually, when directorial 
ownership becomes sufficiently high, the interests of directors and shareholders 
can be effectively aligned. Directors bear a substantial part of the costs and 
receive a substantial part of the benefits from their actions. In addition, as a 
particular category of individual shareholders, directors are insiders who possess 
superior infon-nation on the firni's prospects. Their willingness to invest can serve 
as a signal that helps to resolve the information asymmetry (Lehand and Pyle, 
1977). In short, substantially high directorial ownership can act as a substitute 
monitoring and signalling device to dividend policy and makes dividend policy 
redw-idant. Eckbo and Verma's (1993) empirical evidence indicates that the cash 
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dividend is almost always zero when director-owners have absolute voting control 
of the firm. 
3.3.1.2. Institutional Investors 
In the presence of large external shareholders, managerial discretion can be 
curbed to some extent and agency costs between managers and shareholders are 
reduced because large shareholders have the ability and incentive to monitor and 
discipline management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). This would in tun-i imply a 
lesser role for any corporate payout policy to address the agency problem. On the 
other hand, given the superior inforrnation that large shareholders are likely to 
have conceming the future prospect of the fin-n (because of their easy access to 
and control of the management), the market may interpret the presence of large 
shareholders as a signal of good prospects. From the signalling perspective, in the 
presence of large shareholdings, the management's incentive to use dividend as a 
signalling device is weakened. 
Compared to individual shareholders, institutional investors are likely to 
have a greater preference for systematic dividend payout. First of all, in contrast 
to other shareholders, there is evidence that UK institutional investors monitor the 
companies they invest in less actively (Franks et al., 2001; Faccio and Lasfer, 
1999). Dividend policy hence serves as a valuable corporate control device. In 
addition, the existence of "prudence man" rules and asset-liability management 
considerations may lead to situations where institutional investors strongly prefer 
a particular form of payout (Del Guercio, 1996). Institutions need funds to match 
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their liabilities on an ongoing basis, such as funding pensions or paying out 
insurance policies; high and stable dividends facilitate the flow of funds to and 
from their portfolios (Short et al., 2002; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005). In 
terms of signalling, institutions have to keep a certain distance from management 
to avoid the regulation of "inside-trading", and management therefore still have 
the incentive to use dividend as a signalling device. 
3.3.2 Hypotheses 
Although agency theory and the signalling effect of dividend predict substantial 
and smooth dividends, dividends could be low and flexible provided that an 
incumbent shareholder group with a powerful monitoring ability and superior 
information is present. This argument recognises that dividends need not 
constitute an additional controlling and signalling device when alternative 
mechanisms are at work; otherwise they may simply lead to unnecessary liquidity 
constraints and risks of under-investment (Renneboog and Szilagyi 2007). The 
identity of the controlling shareholders can thus influence the finn's incentive for 
dividend payout; one key to understanding dividend policy in the UK is, therefore, 
to identify the controlling shareholders. Following Gugler (2003), we conjecture 
that the inclination to pay dividend and smooth dividend depends on the identity 
of the controlling group. 
15 
We take Crespi and Rem-ieboog's (2003) approach and assume that all the 
shareholders of a particular type (e. g. financial institutions) form a coalition, and 
15 For all the shareholders we do not consider tax client effects, because after the recent tax reform 
in the UK, dividend income for most shareholders is always at a tax disadvantage relative to 
capital gains. Rather, we conjecture that dividend behaviour is predicted simply by the relative 
level of agency cost and information asymmetry under the control of each shareholder group type. 
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such coalitions then participate in a voting game with the intention to influence 
(or even determine) the payout policy. For instance, financial institutions might 
prefer a particular pattem of payout, while other groups of owners, e. g. directors, 
may care less about this. We group the ownership data in a way that reflects 
different control categories of owners. The criterion for an organisation is the 
largest shareholder category of a company. An additional means for this is a 
combined stakes higher than 10%16 in the company. 
Agency costs and information asymmetry could be substantially different 
depending on the type of controlling shareholder. For director-owner controlled 
firms, neither a major conflict of interest nor large information asymmetry 
between management and owners is present. Directors are the largest 
shareholders, and they therefore bear the major part of the costs and receive the 
major part of the benefits of their actions. This further translates into more 
flexible payout policies, since dividend as a monitoring and signalling device is 
less valuable in those firms. Similar patterns should persist in firms controlled by 
other individual shareholders. The direct involvement of the controlling 
individual shareholder in the management of the firm is more likely than that of 
financial institutions (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Gugler, 2003). The marginal 
control and signalling benefit of dividend should be very low in firms controlled 
by wealthy private individuals with strong monitoring skills and incentives 
(Reimeboog and Szilagyi, 2007). Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007) find that 
payout levels in the UK are lowest in fin-ns that are controlled by individual 
16 Leech (2002) suggests that, given the dispersed ownership structure of UK firms, the equity 
stake needed to incite a shareholder to participate actively in monitoring is not that large. 10% is 
used in our chapter as a threshold to defme shareholders that have a controlling power in UK firms. 
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investors. On the other hand. in firms controlled by institutional investors, agency 
cost and information asymmetry is more severe than in firms controlled by 
directors and other individuals. According to the expected "ranking" of 
shareholder types in their preference for dividends and how efficiently they 
mitigate agency cost and inforn-iational asymmetry, we develop our hypotheses: 
HI: Firms controlled by financial institutions (IC fim-is) are more likely to be 
dividend payers compared to firms controlled by director-owners and other 
individuals (MC finns). 
H2: Firms controlled by financial institutions (IC finns) adjust dividend to current 
income to a less extent and pay relatively smoothed dividend compared to 
finns controlled by director-owners and other individuals (MC finns). 
3.4 Data Description 
Our sample covers UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We exclude 
financial firnis because the nature of their financial decisions is different, being 
determined by different factors. Control structure is derived from the Hemscott 
Guru Acadeniic Database. Accowiting data has been collected from Datastream 
Database. According to these criteria, we select 482 finns that are quoted at the 
London Stock Exchange for which there are 7 years accounting data available 
over the period 2000-2006.17 The reason for choosing this period is that the tax 
17 Ownership data is only available from the years 2002-2005. Given that ownership structure is 
relatively stable over time, we define a firm as an IC (MC) fim'i if the controlling shareholders 
have been institutional investors (manager-owners and other individuals) from 2002-2005. 
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credits on dividend payments to pension funds were abolished in July 1997 and 
Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) ended in April 1999. By selecting this period, 
we try to capture the latest relation between payout policy and control structure in 
the UK firms. Overall, the sample consists of a balanced panel data of 3374 firm- 
year observations. Table 3.1 provides a precise definition of our data. 
-Ins, ert Table 3.1 here- 
3.4.1 Statistics Summary 
Some descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 3.2, Panel A. On average, the 
dividend to book is 0.02, while the earning to book is 0.01. The average values of 
dividend per share-DPS and earning per share-EPS are 5.49 and 10.02. Finally, 
the average log value of total asset is 11.12-, average leverage and Tobin's Q are 
17% and 2.11 respectively. In general, these values are in line with those 
reported in other studies for UK fin-iis (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Short and 
Keasey, 1997). Around 33% (=1098/3374) of the company-year observations 
involve zero dividend payment, with 37% (=1255/3374) showing dividend 
payment equal to, or in excess of, net earning. 
For firms with a positive net income, Panel B shows that the average values 
of dividend to book (dividend per share) and earning to book (earning per share) 
are 0.03 (7.06) and 0.07 (17.86). The median dividend-payout ratio (the ratio of 
dividend payment to net income) over the period is 34%, but there is considerable 
variation around the median. In this, 19% (=454/2370) of the company-year 
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observations involve zero dividend payment and 11% (=253/2370) dividend 
payments equal to, or in excess of, net earning. 
Panel C in Table 3.2 provides time-series summary statistics. Average 
dividend to book (dividend per share) drops from 0.024 (5.38) in 2000 to 0.019 
(4.86) in 2002, and rebounds gradually in later years. It reaches 0.020 (6.76) in 
2006. This reflects the turbulence in the underlying economy during that period 
(i. e. the so-called "early 2000s recession", which affected most western countries 
in 2000-03). Correspondingly, we observe that earning to book (earning per share) 
changes in the same direction, though more dramatically: it starts at 0.016 (8-67) 
in 2000, drops to -0.020 (5.70) in 2002 and reaches a new high of 0.033 (16.39) in 
2006. 
-Insert Table 3.2 here- 
Compared to the change in underlying earnings, dividend payments in the 
UK are relatively smooth over time and are characterised by frequent small 
adjustments, which corroborates our earlier argument of the dividend- smoothing 
hypothesis. This is clearly shown in Chart 3.1. Chart 3.2 shows the distribution of 
dividend for all finns, both MC fin-ns and IC fin-ns. Graph (a) shows that the 
average dividend to book value of MC finns starts lower but ends higher than that 
of IC firnis. From Graph (b) we observe that, on average, IC firms pay a higher 
dividend per share than MC finns, although there is a convergence at the end of 
our sample period. Given that the economy recovered strongly after 2003, these 
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graphs might indicate that MC firms adjust their dividends to the underlyiiig Zý 
income more quickly than 1C firms. 
-Insert Chart 3.1 here- 
-Insert Chart 3.2 here- 
In the context of dividend omission, only 95 fim-is in our sample did not pay 
any dividends throughout the whole sample period, whereas 260 firms always 
paid a strictly positive dividend (not reported in the table). Chart 3.3 illustrates the 
proportion of companies paying dividends in our sample period. In 2000, the 
proportion of dividend-paying companies stood at 70%, but this decreased to 66% 
by 2003, recovering gradually to 68% later. Ferris (2006) found that the 
percentage of dividend payers in the UK declined over the period 1988-2002; our 
results suggest a rebound after 2002, which mirrors the recovery of the economy 
(and corporate earning increase). Moreover, Chart 3.3 shows that IC firms are 
more likely to make positive payouts than MC firrns, although the difference 
becomes less significant in later years. For example, in 2000,74% IC firms made 
a positive dividend payout while only 62% of MC finns paid a dividend. 
However, in 2006, the proportion of dividend payers of IC and MC f1mis are 68% 
and 66% respectively. Following estimation of the basic models for the incidence 
of dividend omission, we examine the dividend omission in a later section. 
-Insert Cha7-t 3.3 here- 
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3.4.2 Mean comparisonfor different groups 
Table 3.3 presents mean comparisons of firm characteristics. Panel A stratifies the 
sample according to whether the fin-ns pay a dividend or not. Companies that omit 
to pay a dividend are on average making a negative profit with an earning to book 
(earning per share) of -0.07 (1-1.07), compared with an average return of 0.05 
(15.37) among dividend-payers. There is also a considerable difference between 
the dividend non-payers and payers in terms of size, growth opportunities and 
financial leverage. Zero-payout firms are smaller in size, have higher growth 
potential and are less leveraged. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 provides summary statistics according to the 
controlling shareholder groups. )Pien we use dividend to book to proxy dividend, 
we observe no significant difference between IC finns and MC finns. However, 
when we compare their average dividend per share, we find that IC firms pay a 
higher dividend with a dividend per share of 5.84, compared with an average 
dividend per share of 4.43 for MC finns. Interestingly, there is a much smaller 
difference between IC firnis and MC firms in terms of earnings (either measured 
through eaming to book or eaming per share). Finally, it seems that IC firms tend 
to be bigger fimis with higher growth opportunities and higher leverage ratio 
when compared to MC firms. 
-Insert Table 3.3 here- 
Finally, we also report the results of the Pearson's correlation of our 
variables in Table 3.4. Dividend to book is positively correlated with income and 
58 
size, but negatively related to leverage. In addition, the correlations between 
dividend per share and earning per share, size and leverage are significantly 
positive; while the correlation between dividend per share and Tobin's Q is 
significantly negative. Corporate earnings (both earning to book and earning per 
share) are positively correlated with firm size, but negatively correlated with 
Tobin's Q. There is also some evidence suggesting that 1C (MC) firms are 
associated with higher (lower) dividend per share, compared to other companies. 
Finally, our results suggest that IC (MC) firms tend to be larger (smaller), having 
higher (lower) growth potential and being more (less) levered. 
-Insert Table 3.4 here- 
3.5 Random-effect Probit regression 
The question of when a firm omits the dividend is a central issue in dividend 
policy. A dividend omission is sensitive because, although people might disagree 
over the proper level of dividend, it is more difficult to argue that a zero Payout 
represents adequate "reward" to shareholders (Correia da Silva et al., 2006). We 
model dividend payout as "events", considering dividend omissions. The 
dependent variable equals I if a firm paid a dividend in a particular year and 0 
otherwise. There are several methods to analyse regression models where the 
dependent variable is 0 or 1. The simplest procedure is just to use the -linear 
probability"' model. However, there are lots of problems with this procedure. The 
most important criticism is that the predicted value can easily lie outside the 
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interval (0,1) and prediction errors can be very large (Maddala, 2001). An 
alternative approach is to assume that we have a regression model 
Yit * ==al + Xit)6 +c it 
where "i" indexes companies and "t" indexes years. aj denotes the unobserved 
company- specific component that is assumed random across companies. while ci, 
represents random error. Yjt* is not observed, and is con-unonly called a -latent 
variable". What we observe is a dummy variable Yj, defined by 
Yit =1 if Yit*>O 
=0 otherwise 
A positive dividend payout (Yi, =1) is observed when the latent variable Yi, * 
crosses a threshold, which is here normalised to zero. The probit and logit models 
differ in their specification of the distribution of the error tenn ej, The difference 
between this specification and the linear probability model is that in the linear 
probability model we analyse the dichotomous variables as they are, whereas in 
this specification we assume the existence of an underlying latent variable for 
which we observe a dichotomous realisation. In this case, if the observed dummy 
variable is whether or not the firm pays a positive dividend, Yi, * will be defined as 
6ýthe propensity or ability to pay dividend". Note that there is both "propensity" 
and "ability" involved, and thus the explanatory variable would contain variables 
that explain both these elements. A positive (negative) coefficient sign indicates 
that the explanatory variable is positively (negatively) associated with the 
likelihood of payout. 
Previous work (Benito and Young, 2001; Fama and French, 2001) has 
documented systematic difference between the samples of paying and non-paying I 
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companies with respect to characteristics such as earning, size, growth and 
leverage. Earning is relevant because firms may face financial constraints to pay 
dividends when their earnings are poor. An important reason cited by firms not 
paying dividend is "poor earnings" (Baker, 1989). DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1992) document that a significant proportion of firms 
that have losses over a five-year period tend to omit their dividend entirely. As 
size can be a proxy for firni maturity and agency cost (Grullon et al., 2002), firms 
of a small size are consequently more likely to pursue a dividend retention 
strategy. The influence of leverage could be twofold: in the short temi, an 
increase in indebtedness could finance an increase in dividend; but in the long run, 
debt-related payouts reduce fimi liquidity and constrain payout to shareholders 
(Hu and Kumar, 2004). Finally, firms lacking growth opportunities are more 
likely to pay dividends back to shareholders, ceteris paribus. We include these 
control variables in our empirical specification. We also control for industry- 
specific and year-specific effects. In addition, we employ two ownership dunimy 
variables, IC and MC. IC (MC) equals one when the financial institutions (the 
director-owners and other individuals) collectively own the largest and higher 
than 10% stakes in the finn, and zero otherwise. Following Benito and Young 
(2001), we use a random effect probit 18 model to investigate the relationship 
between dividend payment likelihood and the control structure. A random effect 
tenn that allows for various unobservable differences in the propensity to pay 
18 As a robustness check, we also did Logit regressions (for an example, see Hu and Kumar, 
2004). The results are very similar to the Probit analysis and are not reported. 
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dividend across companies augments the standard probit model for a binary event. 
Table 3.5 reports the results. 
Overall, with the possible exception of the role of control shareholders, all 
the significant explanatory variables influence dividend payout likelihood in a 
manner consistent with the predictions. We find dividend payers, relative to non- 
payers, tend to be larger, more profitable and have fewer growth opportunities 
(measured through Tobin's Q). This suggests that the probability of a dividend 
payout increases with the severity of agency problem. No evidence suggests that 
higher leveraged firms are more likely to omit a dividend payout. Unexpectedly, 
there is no evidence supporting our earlier conjecture that institution-controlled 
(IC firms) firms are more likely to be dividend payers than the firms controlled by 
director-owners and other individuals (MC firms). In line with Renneboog and 
Szilagyi (2007),, the results from colunu-i (1) even suggest that the payout 
likelihood increases when director-owners and other individuals hold effective 
control. 
We also estimate our model for MC and IC firms. The results are reported in 
colwims (2) and (3) respectively. We observe that for MC (IC) finns, the "size 
coefficient" (earning coefficient) is higher compared to that for IC (MC) firms. 
This might suggest that size (earning) affects MC (IC) firms' payout decisions to 
a large extent. On the other hand, the negative value of "Tobin's Q coefficient" is 
lower for MC firms, which might indicate that they are more likely to omit the 
dividends when the growth potential is high. Surprisingly, we find that the 
"leverage coefficient" is significantly negative for MC fim-is, but significantly 
positive for IC ffirns. Contrary to our expectation, IC finns with higher leverage 
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ratios are more likely to make positive payouts, suggesting that some IC firms 
might go into debt to make positive dividend payouts. 
To sum up, the results uniforinly show that larger, more profitable firms 
with lower growth potential are more likely to be dividend payers, which is 
consistent with other studies. No evidence supports our hypothesis that IC fin-ns 
are more likely to be dividend payers than MC firms; some evidence even 
suggests that MC firms are more likely to be the dividend payers. Our results also 
indicate that earning (size and growth potential) affect IC (MC) finn's payout 
decisions to a large extent. More importantly, we find that less leveraged MC (IC) 
firms are more (less) likely to be dividend payers. 
-Insert Table 3.5 here- 
3.6 Dynamic panel data regressions 
In the previous section we examined the likelihood of a positive dividend payout. 
In this section, we study another interesting question regarding the dividend 
decision: the dividend change in a dynamic setting. 
3.61 Model setting 
Some research studies suggest that, in the dividend decision, directors focus on 
the change in current payout patterns but not the dividend level (Marsh and 
Merton., 1987). The work by Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) on US 
dividend policy suggests that directors change dividend primarily in response to 
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unanticipated and non-transitory changes in their firrn's earnings. Moreover. 
directors are believed to have a long-term payout target ratio, but the market 
imperfections such as information asymmetry and transaction costs may prevent 
them from adapting rapidly to new circumstances. Therefore, managers adjust 
("smooth") payout gradually to eaming shocks over several years. We use 
Lintner's (1956) partial adjustment model (PAM) to explain the dynamics of 
dividend change to allow for the possible delays in the response of fims in 
ad usting their dividend payout. For any year t, the dividend payout of firm i is i 
assumed to be related to earning E j, by a desired payout ratio zj 
D*, t= zi E it 
AD i, ai + ai (D* it -Di, t-l) + cit 
it = ai + ai zi E it+ (I- ad D,, t-l + cit 
where D* lit is the target payout of fin-ii i in period t, -ri the target payout ratio, 
E 
is the current earning, AD it is the change in dividend payments from period t- I to 
t, ai is the firm specific effect, ai is a speed of adjustment coefficient, (I- ad is the 
extent of dividend smoothing, Djj-j is the lagged dividend and ej, is the error item. 
Here the implicit target payout ratio is given by z-i =a zj / (I- a, ). Thus, z- and (I- 
a) are the key parameters to test our hypotheses as these determine the dividend 
payout buridle, i. e. dividend target level and dividend smoothing. A lower level of 
(I- a) indicates a speedier adjustment to target payout level, whereas a lower 
value of 'r indicates less need to payout dividends optimally (Gugler, 2003). 
Partial-effect specifications are dynamic panel data models with the lagged 
dependent variable as a repressor. Hence, traditional estimators, such as fixed- 
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effect within-estimators, are biased (Baltagi, 2001). This bias is most severe when 
the time dimension of the panel is relatively small. The inferences based on such 
estimates are likely to lead to spurious conclusions. The more appropriate 
methodological approach is a dynamic panel data estimation technique. Several 
GMM-type estimators have Proposed a first- differenced equation where the 
differences are instrumented by lagged levels of the regressors (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). Blundell and Bond (1998) later improve this estimation teclu-iique 
by developing the "GMM-in-system estimator". More specifically, the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) estimation technique employs lagged differences of the 
dependent variable as instruments for equations in levels, in addition to using 
levels as instruments for the differences. This gives consistent parameters in short 
panels, provided that the instruments used are valid. It also displays good finite 
sample persistence even when the variables show persistence. The consistency of 
the GMM estimators also depends on the assumption that there is no serial 
correlation in ci, so that Acj, should indicate significant negative first order serial 
correlation and no second order correlation. Tests for serial correlation in the first 
differenced residuals, denoted as ml and m2. are reported in the results. The 
Sargan. test of over-identifying restrictions under the joint null that instruments 
are valid and the model is correctly specified is also reported in the results. We 
estimate the models applying this so-called GMM-in-system estimator using 
PcGive 10 (Doomik and Hendry. 200 1). 
In order to test our conjectures pertaining to the impact of controlling t: l - 
shareholders, we apply a partial adjustment model (PAM) to IC (institution- 
controlled) and MC (director-owners and other individual -controlled) firnis 
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separately and compare the key coefficients of our interests. According to our 
hypotheses, MC firms are supposed to have less incentive to smooth dividends, 
while IC firms are more likely to do so. We first estimate our basic model, 
followed by the fully developed one including all the determinants. 
3.62 Preliminary regression results 
Almost all of the studies done after Linter's study have used per share data 
(Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Correia da Silva, 2006). As Grinstein and 
Michaely suggest, we rely heavily in the dividend dynamic model on the time- 
series property of dividend, and firms typically use past dividend per share in the 
following periods. The use of per share data has the advantage of omitting the 
impact of any capital variation, in terms of either capital stnicture or capital 
amount (Ben Naceur et al., 2006). Table 3.6 reports GMM estimates of the basic 
dynamic dividend models using dividend per share (DPS) as the dependent 
variable. The estimates reported are the output of a two-step optimisation 
procedure. Time dummies and industry dummies are included among the 
independent variables. For all regressions, the p-value of the Sargan test and the 
ml and m2 statistics do not appear to reject the null instrument validity and 
correct model specification. 
When we pool all the firms together in the regression (column 1).. the 
coefficient of the lagged dividend (I- o-, ) is positive and significantly different 
from zero. This is consistent with the widely observed practice of firms adjusting 
dividend payments gradually over time, in line with the "'smoothing" behaviour 
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noted by Linter (1956). The adjustment coefficient ai is 0.47, midway between 0 
and 1. This is consistent with the view that firms may trade-off between two 
different types of costs: costs of making adjustment to their target ratios, and costs 
of being in disequilibrium (Ozkan, 2001). 
We then re-estimate our model using only MC firms (regression 2). In line 
with Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007), our results suggest that, when directors 
form a controlling coalition of shareholders, there is a significant reduction in the 
smoothing coefficient. Regarding t-statistics, surprisingly, for MC firms the 
coefficient of the lagged dividend (DPS) falls short of statistical significance, 
although it is positive as expected. As expected, the strong presence of director- 
owners and other individual shareholders weakens the "path dependence" of the 
dividend. In contrast, when we re-estimate the model for IC firms, we find an 
increase in the smoothing coefficient, as shown in coluinii 3. The coefficient of 
the lagged dividend for IC firms increases to 0.54, compared to a value of 0.40 for 
MC firms. The significant dividend smoothing behaviour under the control of 
institutional investors may be symptomatic of the agency problem and 
infomiation asyn-inietry in the invested fimis. 
For all regressions, the "impact coefficient", i. e. the effect of earning on 
dividend, is positive and significant at a 1% level. which lends support to the 
prediction that firms with higher incomes would pay out more dividends as a 
result of their cash abundance. In addition, the "impact coefficient" for MC (IC) 
firms is relatively higher (lower), which is consistent with our expectation that 
MC (IQ firn-is adjust dividends to a greater (smaller) extent dependent on current 
incomes. Generally, these results are consistent with the expected "ranking of 
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shareholder types in how efficiently they nutigate infom-iational asymmetry and 
agency costs. 
-Insert Table 3.6 here- 
3.6 3 Regression results of afully developed model 
However, bearing in mind that, excepting the prior dividends and current eaming.. 
many other variables are well known to be significant in determining dividend 
and our model could be mis-specified if we exclude them. We add a fixed set of 
regressors (X) to control for firm specific characteristics, i. e. firm size (measured 
through total asset), growth opportunities (measured through Tobin's Q) and 
leverage, and also for year and industry effects. Thus the regression equation 
describing the extended partial -adjustment model can be written as: 
it= zi E i, +)IXil 
AD it= ai + ui (D* it -Dj,, j) + cit 
D it = ai + uizi E it + (I- ai) D i, t-l + +ci, 
We allow for the possibility that current and past shocks (e. g. board turnover) to 
dividend behaviour also affect total asset, Tobin's Q and leverage. All 
explanatory variables are assunied to be enclogenous in the extended model. 
Moreover, to achieve consistency with other variables (e. g. leverage ratio), we 
nornialise the dividend and earning by the book value of total assets. Thus in the 
following analysis we estimate the current dividend to book as the dependent 
variable. Table 3.7 reports the results. 
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In regression 1, the Sargan test indicates that (at the conventional 5% 
significance level) the reported estimates for pooled firms fail to match the 
moment conditions. Therefore we do not interpret the corresponding estimation 
results, and report them for reasons of comparison only. We then re-estimate our 
model using only MC firms (regression 2) and IC firms (regression 3). Both 
regressions pass the Sargan test, and the ml and m2 statistics do not reject the 
null instrument validity and correct model specification. 
Consistent with our previous findings, regression (2) shows that, for MC 
fin-ns only, the current earning is statistically significant and positively influences 
the current dividend. MC firms are more sensitive to current earnings than prior 
dividends and any changes in earnings are directly reflected in dividends. This 
confirms our conjecture that MC firms do not follow stable dividend policies. 
When IC firnis are considered (regression 3), the lagged dividend has a 
significantly positive impact on the current dividend level, which supports 
dividend policy stability in IC firms. Surprisingly, for IC finns the coefficient of 
the current earning falls short of statistical significance, although it is positive as 
expected. This might suggest that IC firnis adopt a stable dividend policy to allow 
shielding of payout from earning shocks. 
In addition, consistent with Khan (2006), we also detect strong evidence that 
larger finns are the ones that tend to pay out higher dividends. One interesting 
result stems from the estimated coefficient of size, which is higher for MC firms 
than for IC finns. This indicates that size affects MC firms' payout levels to a 
large extent. Additionally, the significant and negative coefficient of Tobin's 
indicates MC firnis' reluctance to pay high dividends when they are going 
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through a fast-growing stage. In contrast, the coefficient of Tobin's Q for IC firms 
is insignificant and positive, revealing that IC firms with more growth 
opportunities do not pay lower dividends. 
Above all, we find that firms in the UK are far away from having a 
homogeneous behaviour in terms of dividend. Under both model specifications, 
we obtain some consistent results. First of all, MC firms seem not to care about 
the level of last year's dividend; thus, they do not smooth their dividend policy. In 
contrast, IC firms attempt to maintain stable dividend payments. In addition, the 
current earning income affects IC firms' dividend to a much smaller extent, 
compared to its influence on MC firms. Our analysis suggests that the presence of 
a coalition of institutional investors as the controlling shareholder weakens the 
relationship between corporate earning and payout level, but strengthens the 
dividend "path dependence". This is probably due to the fact that IC firms suffer 
from higher agency costs and information asymmetry; regular dividend payout is 
hence regarded as a valuable governance and signalling device. 
Our findings also explain the gap between the dividend levels of MC firms 
and IC firms observed in chart 3.2. Although the average dividend of IC finns is 
much higher at the beginning of the sample period, since MC firms adjust 
dividends to the earnings more quickly, the gap becomes narrower when the 
economy booms and earning increases. 
-In. sert Table 3.7 here- 
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In our previous work we found that the trading behaviour of institutional 
investors affects their monitoring incentive and ability. From this point of view. 
the presence and monitoring of dedicated institutional investors, i. e. investors 
with long-ten-n investment horizons, would reduce agency cost and information 
asymmetry effectively. Hence, firms controlled by dedicated institutional 
investors are expected to pay relatively unsmoothed dividend compared to firms 
controlled by transient institutional investors. However, since dedicated 
institutions get very few capital gains from equity trading, they might have to rely 
on stable dividend income for asset-liability management considerations. As such,, 
any prediction must be ambiguous. While we further divide IC fin-ns according to 
whether or not they are controlled by dedicated or transient institutional investors, 
there is no evidence to suggest that firms are less engaged in dividend smoothing 
when the controlling shareholders are dedicated institutional investors (not 
reported here. ). 
3.64 Robustness test 
Firstly, in addition to the Sargan test for the validity of the instrument set, we 
careftilly investigated whether the variables used in the analysis are 
predetermined or strictly exogenous with respect to the error term. In order to test 
for the possibility that Xj, is predetennined with respect to the error term, we 
started using instruments dated t-2 for each variable included in the instrument 
set. Later, Xi, t-l was added to the existing instruments. In the presence of 
measurement error. the estimate of the coefficients of X is expected to fall (see. 
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for example, Ozkan (2002) for a more detailed discussion). This procedure is 
carried out for each variable and we detect none of them is pre-deten-nined to the 
error tenn. We also investigated the possibility of strict exogeneity of variables 
with respect to the error term by including current values. Again we detected a 
fall in the estimates of the coefficients. We therefore conclude that no variable is 
strictly exogenous with respect to the error term. 
3.65 Additional test: cross-sectionalregressions 
In order to provide deeper insights into the impact of ownership on dividend 
policy, we present some additional tests. To do so, we estimate a cross-sectional 
dividend model 19 using the average values of each of the fill-n characteristics 
(including ownership variables) over three years in an attempt to mitigate 
problems that might arise from short-term fluctuations. We measure dividend, the 
dependent variable, in 2006 and the explanatory variables over the period from 
2002-2005. Table 3.8 presents the estimation results for the cross-sectional 
dividend model. In column (1), we report regression results for the basic model. 
In line with our previous analysis, our results confirm that large size, high earning 
and low leverage ratio are associated with high dividend payout. No evidence 
sugForests that Tobin's Q significantly affects dividend payout. In column (2) we 
incorporate ownership variables into the model, namely MANO. INSTT and 
OTHL, which are directorial ownership, institutional ownership and other 
individual ownership of the fim-i. There is no evidence to suggest that institutional 
'9 We do not employ a dynamic panel data model since, because the ownership data is only 
available from 20021-22005, the time dimension of the panel is quite small. 
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ownership has a significant impact on the dividend level. In contrast. the 
coefficients of directorial ownership and other individual ownership are 
negatively significant. This underpins the notion that higher directorial ownership 
and other individual ownership lead to lower dividend levels. In column (3), we 
also add the square of directorial ownership and the cube of directorial ownership 
to test a non-linear model. However, the total insignificance of directorial 
ownership suggests little support for a non-linear relationship between directorial 
ownership and dividend level. So far we detect no evidence to support a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and dividend level. In the last regression 
we split the institutional ownership into dedicated institutional ownership 
(INSTD) and transient institutional ownership (INSTA), and find that dedicated 
institutional ownership is significantly associated with lower dividend level. This 
is consistent with our belief that dedicated institutional investors are more active 
corporate monitors, and dividend policy is regarded as a less valuable monitoring 
and signalling device. 
-Insert Table3.8 here- 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates whether dividend behaviour is affected by control 
structure; in particular, we exam the conventional wisdom that dividend and 
shareholder control can be substitutes in mitigating agency cost and information 
asymmetry. Using a panel of UK firms from 2000-2006, we use a random-effect 
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probit model and partial adjustment models to investigate whether the identity of 
a controlling shareholder group affects dividend behaviour. 
Specifically, we attempt to find answers to the following questions: first, 
does control structure affect the dividend policy or not? And second. what are the 
main factors that determine dividend policy making? 
In the first section, a random effect probit model is applied. We detect no 
evidence to suggest that firms controlled by financial institutions (IC firms) are 
more likely to be dividend payers than other films, specifically than firms 
controlled by director-owners and other individuals (MC f1mis). Consistent with 
previous studies, our results find three fundamentals that affect the decision to 
pay dividends in the UK: earning, size and growth potential (measured through 
Tobin's Q). Larger firms with higher earning but fewer growth opportunities are 
more likely to be dividend payers. 
In the dividend dynamic analysis, we first use the basic partial-adjustment 
model as suggested by Linter (1956). We find that IC firms significantly engage 
in dividend smoothing, while MC firms do not. In addition, MC (IC) firms adjust 
dividends to a greater (smaller) extent relative to current incomes. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that IC firms interpret dividend policy less flexibly 
than MC finlis because they face higher agency cost and information asymmetry. 
Secondly, through a fully developed model, we highlight some firm specific 
factors that may influence the dividend payout level. For example, larger firnis 
pay out more dividends and higher growth potential deprives MC firms (but not 
IC firnis) from higher dividends. 
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In the light of these findings, this study is important. It highlights some 
features of UK dividend policy that are not captured by previous studies. It is 
worth noting that firms in the UK are far from having homogeneous behaviour in 
terms of dividend. This study also provides a road map for further research on the 
role of institutional investors in dividend policy. Nevertheless, there is much work 
left to do. The relationship between dividends and ownership structure is of 
central importance and is worth further analysis. More progress could also be 
achieved by using specific ownership data in the dynamic model setting. 
Similarly,, clientele effeCtS20 need to be thoroughly investigated. 
2" Different groups of investors, or clienteles, prefer different policies, e. g. retirees need dividends 
for income. Differential taxes on capital gains and dividend is also one of the main causes of this 
effect. A finn's past dividend policy determines its current clientele of investors. The clientele 
effect assumes that investors are attracted to different company policies. and that when a 
company's policy changes, investors will adjust their stock holdings accordingly. 
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Chart 3.1 
Dividend and income 
(A) BDIV and BINC 
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(B) DPS and EPS 
Chart 3.1 illustrates the underlying income and dividend payout level in our sample Z-- 
period. Graph (A) shows the level of BDfV (dividend to book) and BINC (income to 
book) in the sample period, while Chart 3.1 (B) shows the level of DPS (dividend per 
share) and EPS (earning per share) in the sample period. 
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Chart 3.2 
Distribution of dividend 
(A) Distribution of BDIV 
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Chart 3.2 shows the distribution of dividend for MC fin-ns and IC firnis. Graph (a) shows 
the distribution of BDfV (dividend to book) for MC firms and IC firms. Graph (b) shows 
the distribution of DPS (dividend per share) for MC finns and IC finns. 
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Chart 3.3 
Proportion of sample companies making a positive payout Z! ) 
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Chart 3.3 illustrates the proportion of companies paying dividends in our sample period. 
It shows that IC fin-ns are more likely to inake positive payouts than MC firms, although 
the difference becomes less significant in later years. 
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Table 3.1 
Variables, definition and data sources 
Variables Definition and Source 
Dividend to book, i. e. the sum of ordinary dividend and preference 
BDIV dividend over the book value of total asset (our own calculation) 
Income to book, i. e. net income over the book value of total asset (our 
BINC own calculation) 
Dividend per share, i. e. the sum of ordinary dividend and preference 
DPS dividend over the number of outstanding shares (our own calculation) 
Earning per share, i. e. net income over the number of outstanding shares 
EPS (our own calculation) 
SIZE The logarithm of total asset (Datastream) 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity, 
plus the market value of equity to book value of total asset (our own 
Tobin's Q calculation) 
LEV Total debt over total asset (Datastream) 
The dummy variable equal to I if the controlling shareholders are 
managers and other individuals and equal to 0 otherwise (our own 
MC calculation) 
The dummy variable equal to I if the controlling shareholders are 
IC financial institutions and equal to 0 otherwise (our own calculation 
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Table 3.2 
Financial characteristics of sample fin-ns (N=482) from 2000-06 
Panel A. - Summary statistics 
Mean Min Median Max S. D. 
BDIV 0.02 0 0.02 0.69 0.03 
BINC 0.01 -0.67 0.04 0.78 0.13 
DPS 5.49 0 2.20 80.05 8.08 
EPS 10.02 -94.65 4.37 190.09 22.77 
SIZE 11.12 6.25 11.10 15.27 1.73 
Tobin's Q 2.11 0.11 1.46 21.42 3.17 
LEV 0.17 0 0.13 0.99 0.17 
Panel B: Description of dividend and earning variables for firms with positive income 
Mean Min Median Max S. D. 
BDIV 0.03 0 0.01 0.58 0.03 
BINC 0.07 0 0.06 0.78 0.06 
DPS 7.06 0 4.00 80.05 8.76 
EPS 17.86 0 9.95 190.09 24.41 
Panel C. - A time-series examination of dividend and earning (means) variables 
Variables 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
BDIV 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.020 
BINC 0.016 -0.004 -0.020 -0.010 0.019 0.025 0.033 
DPS 5.38 5.14 4.86 5.00 5.36 5.95 6.76 
EPS 8.67 7.30 5.70 8.25 10.85 13.00 16.39 
The table reports summary statistics for key accounting variables (dividend, earning and 
control variables) for 482 non-financial firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange 
from 2000-1006. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. 
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Table 3.3 
Mean comparisons of firm characteristics 
Panel A. - Characteristics of dividend-payer and non-payers 
Variables 
Dividend-payer 
(obs=1938) 
Mean 
Non-payers 
(obs=996) 
Mean 
t-statistics of 
difference in mewis 
BDIV 0.03 0 31.57* 
BINC 0.05 -0.07 26.38* 
DPS 8.14 0 26.93 * 
EPS 15.37 -1.07 18.29* 
SIZE 11.64 10.05 29.80* 
Tobin's Q 1.79 2.77 -12.51* 
LEV 0.18 0.14 5.94* 
Panel B. - Characteristics of MC-firms and IC-firms 
IC firms (N=337) MC firins (N= 13 0) t-statistics of difference in 
Variables Mean Mean means 
BDIV 0.02 0.02 1.1 
BINC 0.01 0.01 -0.90 
DPS 5.84 4.43 4.02* 
EPS 9.88 9.77 0.02 
SIZE 11.50 10.12 21.86* 
Tobin's Q 2.18 1.96 2.56* 
LEV 0.17 0.14 5.46* 
This table presents mean comparisons of finn characteristics. Panel A analyses dividend- 
payer versus non-payers. Panel B analyses MC finns versus IC firrns. Definitions of 
variables are given in Table 1. * Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 3.5 
Probit regression analysis of a finn's decision to pay dividends 
All finns MC fin-ns IC finns 
Explanatory 
Variable Predicted (1) (2) (3) 
BINC + 3.836*** 3.549*** 3.917*** 
(16.85) (8.56) (14.03) 
SIZE + 0.339*** 0.374*** 0.32-"*** 
(18.08) (10.36) (14.22) 
Tobin's Q -0.113*** -0.171*** -0.106*** 
(-7.35) (4.56) (-6.09) 
LEV 0.228 -0.393 0.374* 
(1.41) (-1.22) (1.88) 
mc 0.425*** 
(2.84) 
IC 0.204 
(1.42) 
Intercept -3.345*** -3.077*** 2 985*** 
(-13.17) (-8.42) (-11.36) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -1570.15 -451.44 -1064.31 
Wald test 772.55 198.66 537.18 
Companies 482 130 337 
Nr of 
Observations 3374 910 2359 
Yj, * =aj + X,,, 8- e, where "i'" indexes companies and "f' indexes years. a, denotes the 
unobserved company-specific component that is assumed random across companies, 
while ej, represents random error. Yi, * is not observed, and is commonly called a "latent 
variable". What we observe is a dummy variable Y, defined by 
Yit =1 ij, yt*>O 
=0 otherwise 
A positive dividend payout (Yi, =1) is observed when the latent variable Y, * crosses a 
threshold,, which is here normalised to zero. Table 6 presents the results of the Probit 
regressions of the likelihood of dividend payments estimated over the period 2000-2006. 
The dependent variable (Yid is an index equal to I if the payout yield is positive, and is 
set equal to 0 otherwise. A positive (negative) coefficient sign indicates that the variable 
is positively (negatively) associated with the likelihood of payouts at the margin. T- 
statistic values are reported in parentheses. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 
1. ***5 ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6 
Basic partial-adjustment model explaining dividend dynamics 
Dependent variable-dividend per share (DPS) 
All finns MC finns IC fin-ns 
Explanato! j Variable Predicted (2) 
DPS + 0.530** 0.400 0.538*** 
(4.78) (1.63) (4.33) 
EPS 0.150*** 0.208*** 0.123 *** 
(5.52) (3.66) (4.55) 
Constant 0.577 -3.651 20* LK 
(0.54) (-0.57) (1.71) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
ml -4.44 -22.12 -3.67 
m2 -1.58 0.20 -1.42 
Wald Ooint) 74.37** 52-12** 67.13** 
Sargan (d. f. ) 46.02(38) 35.76(38) 45.07(38) 
Nroffirms 482 130 337 
DPS it = ai + a, ri EPS j, + (]- u) DPS,,, -, - e, _ where -c, 
the target payout ratio, EPS it is 
the current earning per share, D, _1 
is the lagged dividend per share, ai is the firm specific 
effect, u, is a speed of adjustment coefficient, (]- ui) is the extent of dividend smoothing 
and ci, is the error item. This table presents the GMM-in-system estimation results for 
489 non-financial firms in the UK. The sample period is from 2000 to 2006. A complete 
set of year dummies is included among explanatory variables for all estimations, but 
coefficient estimates are not shown. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order 
and second-order serial correlation in the residuals. Sargan statistics is a test of the over- 
identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as )C 2 (k) under the null of valid 
instruments, with degree of freedom (k) reported in parentheses. A Wald test of joint 
significance is reported as well. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.7 
Fully developed partial-adjustment model explaining dividend dynamics 
Explanator 
Dependent variable 
y Variable Predicted 
- dividend to book (BDIV) 
All fians MC firms 
(1) (2) 
IC finns 
(3) 
BDfVt-l + 0.118** 0.124 0.105*** 
(2.27) (1.46) (2.80) 
BINC + 0.020* 0.024** 0.010 
(2.215) (2.20) (1.25) 
SIZE + 0.003** 0.005** 0.003** 
(2.21) (- . -0) (2.25) Tobin's Q 0.0002 -0.00 1* 0.0003 
(0.70) (-1.69) (1.36) 
LEV 0.0002 -0.011 0.005 
(0.04) (-0.93) (0.83) 
Constant -0.016 -0.049* -0.022 
(-1.09) (-1.9-)) (-1.24) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
ml -3.31 -1.81 -3.42 
m2 -0.71 -0.19 -0.53 
Wald Ooint) 22 2.81 ** 221.7 5** 26.12** 
S argan (d. f. 131.1 (95) 106.6(95) 118.4(95) 
Nr of fin-ns 482 130 337 
_BDIV, = ai + a, ic, 
BINC, + (I- u, ) BDIV, _1 - t7i yXit +-,,,, where z-, the target payout ratio, BINC, is the current earning to book, BDIVj,, I is the lagged dividend tp book, aj is the 
firm specific effect, u, is a speed of adjustment coefficient, (]- ad is the extent of 
dividend smoothing and c, is the error item. Xj is a fixed set of regressors to control for 
firm specific characteristics, i. e. finn size, Tobin's Q and leverage, year and industry 
effects. This table presents the GMM-in-system estimation results for 489 non-financial 
firms in the UK. The sample period is from 2000 to 2006. A complete set of year 
dummies is included among explanatory variables for all estimations, but coefficient 
estimates are not shown. ml and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second- 
order serial correlation in the residuals. Sargan statistics is a test of the over- identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X" (k) under the null of valid instruments, with 
degree of freedom (k) reported in parentheses. A Wald test of joint significance is 
reported as well. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels. respectively. Lý 
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Table 3.8 
Cross-sectional regressions of dividend on ownership and other firrn characteristics 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign (1) 
(2) (3) (4) 
BINC + 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
(9.23) (9.48) (9.48) (9.44) 
SIZE 0.001** 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 
(2.20) (0.42) ) (0.12) (413) 
Tobin's Q 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(1.10) (1.10) (1.12) (1.10) 
LEV -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.024*** 
(-3.59) (-3.74) (-3.67) (--33.71) 
MANO -0.014** -0.051 -0.01-)* 
(-2.11) (-1.43) (-1.93) 
MAN02 0.122 
(0.93) 
NIAN03 -0.097 
(-0.77) 
INSTT -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.12) (-0.19) 
INSTD -0.015* 
INSTA 0.016 
(1.49) 
OTHO -0.019** -0.019** -0.0 17* 
(-2.09) (-2.02) (-1.85) 
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 
Nr of fin-ns 482 482 482 482 
BDIV it = aj +BINC it 8i + X, 6+ Vit 11 +,, it. The table presents cross-sectional 
regressions predicting dividend payout level. Xi is a set of re ressors to control for firm 41) 9 
specific characteristics, i. e. firm size, Tobin's Q and leverage, year and industry effects, 
Vi is a set of regressors to control for fin-n ownership structure, i. e. MANO (managerial 
ownership), INSTT (institutional ownership), INSTD (dedicated institutional ownership), 
NSTA (transient institutional ownership) and OTHO (other external shareholdings). The 
dependent variable is BDIV, which is measured in 2006 as the dividend to book. The 
means of the independent variables are measured over the period 2002-2005. All 
regressions include industry dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional Investors, Board of Directors and Firm 
Performance 
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4.1 Introduction 
Being the most important shareholders in the UK, activism of institutional 
investors and what this means with respect to the management of companies has 
become a hot topic. 
Separation of ownership and control has resulted in managerial dominance 
and concentration of power among corporate elites. Boards are viewed by the 
marketplace as being too closely allied with management (Brown Jr., 1998). Due 
to the constraints of time, knowledge and group process, many boards find it hard 
to accomplish what the public and shareholders expect of them: directors are 
often not aware of shareholder concerns (Solomon, 2007), and they often cannot 
refashion the firni because they are subject to its old routines and embedded 
information (Roe, 2004). A further problem arises when executive directors hold 
large stakes and can entrench themselves easily. The effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms in the board typically also requires the presence of large investors 
that have the leverage to rein in some managerial agency costs and to bring 
necessary organisational change to the firm (Stapledon, 1996; Roe, 2004). 
Institutional investors, by virtue of their size, are an exception compared to 
the small, apathetic shareholders envisioned by Berle and Means (1932), and thus 
become the natural candidates to watch the management. Institutional investors 
are presumed to be capable of influencing the board's decision-making either by 
carrying out actions directly or acting through proxies such as directors, and thus 
supervising the management quality and firm perforniance. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Clay (2002) find that institutional investor ownership is 
significantly and positively related to firm performance and the positive 
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relationship between performance and managerial ownership is strengthened in 
the presence of large institutional shareholders. Cornett et al. (2007) also find 
some evidence of the complementarity of institutional investors and outside 
directors with respect to firm performance. 
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between institutional ownership 
and corporate performance for a sample of UK firms in the years 2004 and 2005. 
Our work contributes to the current literature on several grounds. 
First of all, our study exams whether institutional ownership makes any 
appreciable difference to firm performance, both directly and indirectly. We 
specifically analyse the potential interactions between the monitoring of 
institutional investors and two governance mechanisms in the board: the incentive 
effect provided by director ownership, and the supervisory role of non-executive 
directors. Most perfomance literature treats institutional investors and the board 
of directors as independent mechanisms. There might be substitutionary or 
complementary ways, however, of reducing agency costs and enhancing firm 
performance such that the impact of one mechanism depends on the chosen level 
of the other. From our point of view, a close scrutiny of institutional investors 
could bring a managerial quality increment and hence an improvement in 
performance. That is to say, institutional monitoring makes the board of directors 
work more effectively and thus contributes indirectly to better firm performance 
without changing the board's ownership and structure. In this chapter, we assume L- 
that the presence of institutional investors affects the efficiency of the governance 
mechanisms in the board (i. e. director ownership and outside directors) by 
moderating their relationships xvith firni performance. 
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Secondly, we consider additional factors that might provide disincentives to 
institutional monitoring. For example, a free-rider problem may exist between 
institutional shareholders and other external shareholders. It is argued that the 
direct involvement of the controlling individual shareholders in the management 
of the firm is more likely than for financial institutions (Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
In the presence of other external large shareholders, institutions are able to take 
more of a "back seat". In addition, the monitoring of institutional investors might Z-- 
be vulnerable to pressure from the executives. Institutional investors might be 
coerced into voting with the executives; nonetheless, institutions that hold an 
influential stake could probably overcome the conflicts and use their clout to 
appropriate corporate business. We therefore further our study by developing 
another hypothesis: that both the direct and indirect impact of institutional 
investors on fim-i performance will be more significant when: (1) no other large t-- 
external shareholding is present, and (2) when there is a single institutional 
shareholding larger than executive ownership. 
Finally, in our study we differentiate between executive ownership and non- 
executive ownership. Equity ownership as an incentive mechanism might work 
differently for executive directors and non-executive directors. The primary role 
of executive (inside) directors is decision management, while that of non- 
executive (outside) directors is decision control. The greater the degree of shares 
concentrated in the hands of corporate controllers, such as non-executive 
directors, the more effective their control should be. In contrast, the consequences 
of a high executive shareholding are less clear. While low 
levels of executive 
ownership align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, 
hiLyher 
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executive ownership might lead to managerial entrenchment. Some research 
suggests that there is a curvilinear relation between finn perfonnance and the 
fraction of shares owned by insiders (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes. 
1990). However, very few performance papers have attempted to assess 
separately the influence of share ownership by executive directors and non- 
executive directors, and these reach different conclusions (Morck et al., 1988-, 
Bhagat and Black, 2002; Mura, 2007). 
Our empirical study finds some evidence suggesting that institutional 
ownership affects firni perfonnance both directly and indirectly. However, the 
relationship is a complex one. The analysis shows that higher institutional 
ownership is associated with better fin-n performance (measured through ROA 
and Tobin's Q), and the difference is more significant when no other large (>5%) 
shareholder is present. Furthermore, after we split the sample firnis, we find that 
institutional ownership only strengthens the link between executive ownership 
and perforniance if no other large external shareholding is present, or if there is a 
single institutional shareholding higher than the executive ownership. Our 
findings underpin the institutional monitoring hypothesis and suggest some 
complementarity between institutional investors and executive directors with 
respect to firm performance. Our analysis also suggests that institutional 
monitoring is subject to the free-rider problem and executive pressure. In the 
context of non-executive directors., there is no evidence to suggest that the 
presence of institutional investors makes them work more effectively (e. g. a 
strengthening of the link between the proportion of non-executive directors and L- 
fiim perfonnance). 
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides the 
theoretical and empirical background relating to institutional investors, the board 
of directors and finn perfon-nance; Section 4.3 discusses corporate governance in 
UK and its implications; Section 4.4 presents the hypotheses and data; Section 4.5 
presents key results and possible explanations in the light of existing theory and 
evidence; and Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Theoretical and empirical background 
Recently, believers in the link, between good corporate governance and greater 
shareholder value received highly visible evidence to support their views. A 2003 
study by US academics, Gomper et al., found that a fund that had bought 
companies with top ranked governance and sold short the bottom companies 
throughout the 1990s would have outperformed the market by 8.5% percent a 
year. In the UK, research by Deutsche Bank (2004) shows a link between 
corporate governance and share price perfom-lance for FTSE 350 companies in 
the UK from 2002-2003: the top 10 percent of companies by governance stnicture 
outperforn-led the bottom 10 percent by 25 percent over the period. This provides 
evidence to back up the consensus view that good corporate governance is not 
only relevant to managing the risk, but also to adding value. 
ln this section, we discuss some governance mechanisms with regards to the 
board of directors and institutional investors, and discuss their potential influence 
on firm perfolmance. 
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4.2.1 The board ot'directors 
Cadbury Report (1992) states that the role of the board is -setting the company's 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to the shareholders on their 
stewardship". There are two important internal governance mechanisms in the 
board: the incentive effect provided by director ownership, and the supervisory 
role of non-executive directors. 
4.2. LI Alignment and entrenchment effect qf director ownership 
An important internal governance mechanism is director ownership, which is 
traditionally viewed as providing a direct economic incentive for directors to 
fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities (Bhagat and Carey. 1999). In this way, 
director owi-iership alleviates the agency conflicts in the firm, resulting in higher 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This convergence-of-interest model 
suggests that there is a linear relationship between director ownership and fin-n 
performance. However, the roles of the two dimensions of director ownership, 
executive ownership and non-executive ownership, in governance problems 
plausibly differ. Many researchers have questioned the effectiveness of non- 
executive directors as monitors, arguing that they are motivated to act in the tý 
interests of other shareholders only if they have a significant investment in the 
finu (Jensen, 1993). The greater the degree of shares concentrated in the hands of 
corporate monitors, such as non-executive directors, the more effective their 
monitors should be. In contrast, the consequences of a higher executive 
shareholding are less clear. As decision makers, it is possible that too large an 
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ownership stake leads executives to misuse their power to derive private benefits 
from their positions and entrench themselves at the expense of other investors 
(Morck et al., 1988). This might lead to managerial entrenchment whereby other 
shareholders are unable to influence their actions. For example, Crespi-Claders 
and Renneboog (2003) suggest, given that executive directors have similar private 
benefits of control, that they may combine their shareholdings into one voting 
block and try to obstruct any attempts to remove them. For the UK, Franks et al. 
(2001) show that disciplinary actions against management are undertaken in the 
wake of poor performance, but directors with a large stake can successfully 
impede overhauls of the board. Some researchers suggest that there might be a 
curvilinear relation between the Tobin's Q of the firin and the fraction of shares 
owned by insiders (Stulz, 1988; Morck et al., 1988, McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). 
4.2.1.2 Supervisory potential q the board ?f 
The board also serves to mitigate manager- shareholder conflict. This mechanism 
is composed of executive (inside) directors and non-executive (outside) directors. 
Although the board of directors is supposed to limit management's self-serving 
behaviour, directors who are also executives are obviously not objective monitors. 
Non-executive directors, on the other hand, are "delegated monitors". charged by 
shareholders who oversee management's use of firm resources (Hart, 1995). In 
addition, non-executives, who are not full-employees of the firm, have the 
incentive to develop a reputation as decision control experts (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Remeboog, 2000). The supervisory activity of the board should depend on 
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the weight of the outsiders (non-executives). Some authors document a positive 
relationship between the proportion of outsiders in the board and firm 
performance (Daily and Dalton, 1992; Beatty and Zajac, 1994); some also suggest 
that outside directors provide a monitoring function in extraordinary or crisis 
situations (Romano, 1993; Cotter et al., 1997). In contrast, many studies find little 
evidence suggesting that firms with a majority of outside directors perforrn better 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Despite the fact 
that empirical and anecdotal evidence fails to obtain consistent results, the trend is 
clear: non-executive directors have increased as a proportion of the board and 
dominate important committees. Recently, a number of forces external to the firm, 
such as the increasingly active role of large shareholders, have forced outside 
directors to seriously consider their responsibilities. After all, they are primarily 
agents of the shareholders, not managers' advisors. 
4.2.2 Institutional investors 
Owners, if not actively managing themselves., are probably the most powerftil 
external force affecting a firm's strategy and perforniance. Although generally 
speaking it is the managers and directors who are best tasked with running the 
corporation, it is contended that shareholders should have a significant voice in 
some of the important or high profile decisions. Several studies, including Black 
(I 992b) and Pound (198 8), have contended that institutional shareholders perforrn 
a monitoring function similar to that of block-holders. 
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4.2.2.1 Institutional investors andperformance 
Institutional activism is a new phenomenon, as institutional investors have only 
recently achieved the size and the focus to affect the management of companies 
significantly. Although institutional investors cannot, do not want to and should 
not watch every step a manager takes, they could add value to a firm in many 
areas. Institutional investors can potentially encourage valuable actions and stop 
some of the bad actions. They can potentially add value by, among other things, 
motivating the board of directors (which we will elaborate on later) and stopping 
value-decreasing charter amendments, discouraging diversifications that benefit 
managers but not shareholders and encouraging value-producing takeovers and 
preventing bad takeovers. 21 The monitoring role of institutional investors suggests 
that companies in which they hold large stakes have better corporate governance 
and ultimately higher values than widely held companies. 
There are some concerns about institutional oversight. Controlling 
shareholders might expropriate from minority shareholders or pursue interests of 
special interest groups (La Porta et al., 1999); after all, institutions are themselves 
managed by money managers who need watching (Romano, 1993; Murphy and 
Van Nuys, 1994). But there are several other factors that limit the downside risk 
from increasing institutional power: first, as agents, money managers won't take 
the legal chances that a single shareholder might because they only keep a 
fraction of the gains and face personal risk if they breach legal rules; second, an 
institutional voice usually requires a number of institutions, including different 
21 in line with Stapledon (1996) and Jennings (2005), we define monitoring as "any forin of 
involvement, direct or indirect, at firm level of industry-wide, by institutions in corporate 
o, overnance". In this definition, the direct versus indirect distinction refers to xNhether institutions 
themselves carry out the actions or prefer to act through proxies such as the board of directors. 
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types of institutions, and so money managers can monitor each other's actions to 
some extent; finally, corporate managers can watch their observers and, if the 
institutions abuse their power, corporate managers can complain loudly and often 
to the law-makers (Black, 1992a, Pinto, 2006). To our best knowledge, the 
accumulated evidence concerning the consequences of institutional investor 
activism shows that much of the alleged adverse effects of institutional voice have 
not materialised so far. 
The gains from institutional shareholders are likely to be subtle, not 
dramatic. The gains may also occur indirectly, in ways that are hard to verify in 
quantitative studies. There is some modest evidence that institutional investors 
perform a monitoring function, or at least that their presence correlates with 
improved performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Clay (2002) find that 
institutional investor ownership is significant and positively related to Tobin's 
Nesbitt (1994), Smith (1996) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) also found 
that institutional activism had a significant positive impact on the financial 
performance of companies. On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Karpoff et al. (1996), Duggal and Miller (1999), Faccio and Lasfer (2000) and 
Jennings (2005) find no such significant relationship. The evidence, taken as a 
whole, is suggestive rather than conclusive. Institutional oversight might add 
value to investee firms, but we do not yet know how much value it adds. 
4.2.2.2 Institutional investors, the board of directors andfirm peýformance 
As owners, large institutional shareholders have the incentive to exercise 
close oversight, control management and corporate decision-making in order to 
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redress the power imbalance, reduce agency cost and increase shareholder wealth 
(Ingley et al., 2004). They can thus affect firm perfonnance by actively 
participating, monitoring or ratifying the board's decisions, and ensuring that only 
shareholder value-adding projects are implemented. As owners, large institutional 
shareholders have the incentive to exercise close oversight, control management 
and corporate decision-making in order to redress the power imbalance, reduce 
agency cost and increase shareholder wealth (Ingley et al., 2004). They can thus 
affect firm performance by actively participating, monitoring or ratifying the 
board's decisions, and ensuring that only shareholder value-adding projects are 
implemented. However, the influence of institutional owners is usually "latent"' 
rather than "active"; 22 much of the promise of shareholder monitoring lies in 
informal effects to monitor corporate managers or communicate a desire for 
change in a company's management or policies. The targeted board would react 
to the voice of institutional investors presumably because their campaigns could 
indicate incipient disquiet an-long the firm's shareholder base, and managers don't 
want to activate another corporate governance mechanism, such as a takeover, a 
proxy fight or a melt-down of the company's stock price (Roe, 2004). 
Studies examining the influence of institutional investors on managerial 
quality provide conflicting results. Investigating proxy contests, Pound (1988) 
reports results indicating that institutions do not act as efficient monitors and are 
more likely to vote in favour of the management. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) find 
that, in the UK, pension fund holdings do not lead companies to introduce more 
22 Active power, usually in hands of a fin-n's executives, is the power literally to control key 
decisions regarding products, markets and investment-, latent power, in contrast, is the power to 
ascertain certain decision choices (Hernian, 198 1). 
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independent non-executive directors or outperform their counterparts. In contrast, 
Noe (2002) demonstrates that a core group of institutional investors can naturallv 
develop the goals of monitoring the corporation and preventing managers from 
engaging in opportunism. Ingley et al. (2004) also claim that mechanisms to 
increase shareholder voice and loyalty help the board fw-iction effectively and 
may increase both efficiency and fairness for all stakeholders. There is also 
empirical evidence showing that firm value and managerial ownership relation 
changes substantially when institutional ownership is considered jointly. In 
examining the relationship between perfom-iance and managerial ownership, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a curvilinear relationship between them, and 
the inclusion of institutional ownership increases the inflection point of the curve, 
which might suggest that institutional ownership reinforces the positive effect of 
managerial ownership on corporate value. Short and Keasey (1997) also find that 
a positive relationship between performance and managerial ownership is 
strengthened in the presence of large institutional shareholders, a result they 
suggest is consistent with the efficient institutional monitoring hypothesis. More 
recently, using US data from 1988-1999, Clay's work (2002) shows the incentive 
effect of higher managerial ownership dominating the entrenchment effect 
everywhere once institutional ownership is controlled for, which shows a 
complementary relation between managerial and institutional ownership for firm 
value. 
4.2.2.3 Disincentives to institutional monitoring 
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There are additional factors that might provide disincentives to institutional 
monitoring and intervention; the governance actions of institutions may be seen 
as conditioned by a free-rider problem and executive pressure. 
As Roe (1990) has pointed out, it is not just the separation of ownership and 
control that gives rises to an agency problem between shareholders and managers, 
but also the atomistic or diffuse nature of corporate ownership. While "free- 
riding" may be an option for each institution, for institutions collectively the 
situation is less tenable. A collective action problem seems manageable for the 
large British institutions. The world of British institutions is close-knit; the 
existence of a communication network and the long-ten-n nature of mutually 
advantageous relationships between City institutions may contribute to an 
environment in which cooperation can take place and free riding is reduced 
(Black and Coffee, 1994; Short and Keasey, 1997). However, we still have to 
consider why institutions would monitor the management when they can free ride 
on other external large shareholders. The absence of a generally accepted 
mechanism for cost sharing among shareholders, institutional investors and other 
large shareholders (corporations, individuals and families), presents a major 
obstacle to such collective action. In the presence of other large external 
shareholders, institutions may be able to take more of a "back seat". Hence the 
potential of institutional monitoring might be independent of other large 
shareholders, due to the free-rider problem. 
Moreover, there are inevitable conflicts of interest among various corporate 
stakeholders groups. and the most fmidamental of these between owners and the 
management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Paris, 2001). The corporate governance 
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preferences of management (specifically the executives) do not always align Nvell 
with those of shareholders, and one motivation for executives to hold common 
stocks of their company is to increase their influence in setting the firm's general 
strategies (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). Although investors are becoming 
more active, their monitoring is susceptible to managerial interference. Man. y 
institutions that choose not to exit have succumbed to managerial pressures to 
support voting proposals that are not in the shareholders' interests (Kostant, 1999). 
Greater stock ownership by managers and executives increases the power of 
internal consistency and decreases the power of external consistency in 
influencing a firm's strategies. Nonetheless, strong institutions that hold an 
influential stake could probably overcome the conflicts and use their clout to 
appropriate corporate business. Short and Keasey (1997) find that the presence of 
large institutional shareholders strengthens the relation between performance and 
managerial ownership more significantly if a single institutional shareholding is 
larger than the managerial ownership. 
4.3 Governance characteristics in the UK 
The ownership structure in the UK is characterised by dispersed ownership, 
strong managers and the prevalence of institutional investors. Moreover, directors C) t7l - 
of UK companies perform more of an advisory than a monitoring role (Franks 
and Mayer, 2000), i. e. the powers to enforce fiduciary responsibilities on directors 
are weak. Non-executive directors of UK companies are not expected to play as 
active a monitoring role as their US counterparts. Despite the fact that the 
Cadbury Report (1992) lead to substantial changes in the board structure by 
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increasing the proportion of non-executive (outsider) directors on the board, there 
has not been much evidence relating to the effectiveness of those non-executive 
directors (Ozkan, 2006). In addition, British non-executive directors may not be 
independent; according to the Higg Report (1999), almost half of the non- 
executives surveyed were recruited to their roles through personal contacts or 
friendship. As Hart (1995) suggests, it may be that only "quiet non- executives" 
are selected for board positions. 
There is a strong need to reduce discretion in the board, and the tremendous 
growth in institutional ownership and increasing role of institutional investors as 
firrn monitors provides a possible solution. According to the Nation Statistics 
(2006), at the end of 2006 institutional investors owned around 80% of UK 
equity. 23 They are believed to have the capability to monitor their investments, 
and by the virtue of the magnitude of their investments, can affect managerial 
behaviour. This has led to the development of sophisticated systems of 
engagement between institutional investors and the board of directors in the UK. 
While institutions in the United States focus more on exercising voting rights, 
those in the UK enjoy much greater leeway for activism and involve themselves 
in general issues such as board composition and structure, management 
compensation and issues the concerning disclosure of information (Stapledon, 
1996, Monks, 2002). American style proxy contexts are quite rare in UK; most 
activism comes in the form of informal jawboning, which is less costly. The very 
21 With insurance companies 15%, pension funds 13%. unit trusts, investment trusts and other 
financial institutions together holding some 13%; and overseas investors 40%. 
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fact that public action has been taken suggests that previous "behind the scene" 
attempts to influence the board have failed. 
UK institutional investors are also encouraged by a series of governance 
codes to air their views on investee companies and are prepared to enter into a 
dialogue with the management if they do not accept the company's position. In 
particular., they are expected to monitor the boards where there is a concentration 
of power in the hand of a chief executive officer, seek to promote the influence of 
non-executive directors and bring about changes to under-performing companies 
(Cadbury Report, 1992). The Higgs Report (2003) suggests that stronger links 
need to be established between the board of directors and a company's principle 
shareholders, which is also included in the Combined Code (2003): 
"The Chairman should ensure that the views of shareholders are communicated 
to the board cis a whole ... The 
board should state in the annual report the steps 
they have taken to ensure that the members of the board, and particular the non- 
executive directors, develop an understanding qf the views of major shareholders 
about their company ... " 
(The Combined Code, 2003, section D. 1) 
Significant progress has been achieved. In 2005, Solomon (2007) distributed 
a questiomiaire to study the attitude of UK institutional investors towards 
relationship investing, and the responses suggest engagement and 
dialogue had 
become areas of competitive advantage for institutions, as well as means of 
monitoring management and improving corporate performance. 
The latest IMA 
1 (V 
U-, 
survey (2005) also reveals a recent trend of institutional engagement with the 
management. 34 UK fund managers, who manage 55% of all UK equities 
managed within the UK, participated in this survey. It is reported that all the 
participants of IMA enter into dialogue with the directors and senior management 
of investee companies where there are concerns. Certain managers maintain that 
they are proactive and enter into a dialogue to discuss matters in general and not 
just when there are concerns. Respondents also demonstrated relatively consistent 
frequency of meetings with independent directors in 2003 and 2004. 
4.4 Hypotheses and Data 
4.4.1 Hypotheses 
The monitoring of institutional investors implies that companies in which they 
hold large stakes probably have better corporate governance., and ultimately 
higher values. Our first hypothesis is to test the direct influence of institutional 
ownership on performance: 
Hl: The degree of institutional ownership is positively related to firm 
perfoimance. 
Much of the value of an institutional voice could be realised through 
improving management quality. For example, by monitoring the executives and 
curbing their discretion, institutional monitoring could enhance (repress) the 
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incentive (entrenchment) effect of executive ownership, and so we design our 
second hypothesis to test the indirect impact of institutional ownership on 
performance: 
H2: The positive (negative) relationship between executive ownership and firm 
perfonnance is strengthened (weakened) by the presence of significant 
institutional ownership. 
Non-executive directors could not be truly independent unless they are 
connected to a powerful group outside the company that could counterbalance 
company management, such as institutional investors. Given the increased 
emphasis on the value of stakeholder relations in contributing to performance and 
managing risk, building shareholder relations can enhance the effectiveness of 
non-executive directors (Comett, 2007). Our third hypothesis also concerns the 
indirect impact of institutional ownership: 
HI The positive relationship between non-executive ownership / the proportion 
of non-executive directors in the board and firm performance is 
strengthened by the presence of significant institutional ownership. Cý 
Finally, we incorporate disincentives to institutional monitoring and 
intervention. The governance actions of institutions may be seen as conditioned 
by the free-rider problem and/or executive pressure. We hence further our study 
by testing another hypothesis: 
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H4: The impact (both direct and indirect) of institutional ownership on firm 
perfon, nance is more significant in some circumstances, for example if no 
other large external shareholder is present, or if there is a single institutional 
shareholding larger than the executive ownership. 
We should bear in mind that different governance mechanisms might be 
substitutes or complements to each other (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Cornett et al., 
2007; Florackis and Ozkan, 2007). Although we expect that institutional 
monitoring would complement the function of the board of directors, from a 
theoretical perspective there is a possibility that the monitoring of institutional 
investors weakens the monitoring incentives of the directors. For example. there 
may be a substitution effect between the monitoring of institutional investors and 
the supervision of non-executive directors: if institutional activism curbs the 
executive discretion, there is a low probability of incurring wealth-destroying 
actions and, therefore, it is less necessary for non-executive directors to perfonn a 
control activity. 
4.4.2 Data and Variables 
Our initial sample consists of all quoted, non-financial UK firn-is for which ftill 
data can be obtained fi-orn the years 2000 to 2005. We obtain information from 
two different sources. Infomiation on a finn's ownership structure and board 
structure is derived from the Hemscou Gitru Academic Database, which provides 
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financial data for the UK's top 300,000 companies and detailed data on all 
directors of UK-listed companies. Accounting data comes from the Datastrearn 
database. Specifically, we use Datastrearn to collect data for firm size, market 
value of equity, total asset, dividend and the level of debt. Financial fin-ns are 
excluded because of the specificity of their financial ratios. These criteria provide 
us with a total of 833 firms, representing 1544 non-financial listed firms in the 
UK. For all variables, we use the average value to mitigate potential problems 
that may arise due to short-term fluctuations and extreme values in data. To 
reduce potential endogeneity, we measure perfom-iance in 2004 and 2005, and the 
explanatory variables over the period 2000-2003. Analytical definitions for all 
these variables are given in table 4.1. 
-Insert Table 4.1 here- 
4.4.2.1. Peiformance variables 
Researchers have to choose between accounting profitability (ROA) and market- 
price perfon-nance (Tobin's Q). In this context, it can be argued that accounting- 
based measures are both stable and less subject to speculative and exogenous 
shocks than market-based measures, although a countervailing can be that the 
former are in principle subject to the manipulation of managers. Besides this, they 
have different time perspectives: backward- looking for accounting-based 
measures, and forward-looking for market-based measures. Accounting-based 
measures are historical reports not directly affected by chantgre 
in the equitN 
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market, but rather by accounting conventions for valuing assets and revenue 
recognition. Market-based measures are used as alternatives since they are not 
affected by these limitations and incorporate the expected future gains that are not 
currently reflected on the books. In our study, we employ both a counting-based 
measure (ROA) and a market-based measure (Tobin's Q) to proxy corporate 
performance. To reduce the weight of extreme values, we have capped Tobin's 
and ROA at the 5 
th 
and 95 
th 
percentiles. 
4.4.2.2 Ownership and board variables 
The bulk of research examining the impact of institutional investors measures 
their influence by their percentage ownership in the fimi. Maug (1998) studies 
whether institutions that use their abilities to influence corporate decisions are 
partially a function of the size of their holdings. In this chapter., we consider two 
measures of effective institutional investment in the firm: the fraction of shares 
owned by all institutional shareholders; and the fraction of shares owned by the 
largest single institutional shareholder. Other external large shareholding is also 
included in our study to account for the controlling power of other owners (e. g. t7l 
corporate, individual and family). If Berle and Means (1932) are right, then 
higher ownership concentration should be positively related to perfonnance, as 
higher concentration makes the owners more able and willing to monitor 
managers. Finally, we also examine the governance mechanisms in the board 1-n 
intensely. Our explanatory variables include executive ownership, non-executive 
ownership and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
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4.4.2.3 Control Variables 
In order to understand firm performance fully, it is necessary to examine other 
detenninants and organisational characteristics as well. The selection of control 
variables is dictated by the literature and data availability. In the equation for firm 
performance, we control for leverage, dividend payout, firm size and industry 
effects. 
Debt financing not only reduces the free cash flow Problem (Jensen, 1986), 
but also encourages lenders to monitor (Stiglitz, 1985) and provides tax shields. 
However, too much debt increases the risk of bankruptcy, limits the firm's ability 
to raise new debt and subsequently may force firms to pass up valuable 
investment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Hence the influence of leverage on 
performance is ambiguous. Dividend is also controlled in the analysis. Some 
researchers contend that dividend payout relieves the free cash problem and 
restrains managerial discretion (Jensen 1986). In this case, one would expect a 
positive relation between dividend payout ratio and later firm perforniance. 
Finally, the design of the efficient bundle of governance mechanisms may vary 
systematically by industry or size of the firm (Faina and Jensen, 1983); size also 
acco-Lmts for the economics of scale. 
4.4.3 Sample characteristics 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. 
It reveals that the average values of ROA and Tobin's Q are 0.02 and 2.07 
respectively. As far as the directors' ownership is concerned, the average 
proportion of stakes held by executive directors (non-executive directors) is 
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10.67% (3.71 %). The average institutional ownership reaches 28.12%, while the 
average of the largest single institutional stake is 12.68%. On average, the other 
external shareholders own 7.64% stakes. Also, the average proportion of non- 
executive directors is 50%, the average debt ratio is 19% and the average 
dividend payout is 2%. Finally, the average log value of total asset is 11.29. In 
general, these values are in line with those reported in other studies for UK finns 
(Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, Short and Keasey, 1997). 
-Insert Table 4.2 here- 
The results of the Pearson's correlation of our variables are reported in 
Table 4.3. The correlation between institutional ownership and ROA is negative 
and weak, while the correlation between institutional ownership and Tobin's Q is 
positively significant. ROA is positively related to size, while Tobin's Q is 
negatively related to it. Consistent with previous evidence (Faccio and Lasfer, 
2000), both executive and non-executive ownership are negatively correlated with 
size, suggesting that directors hold large stakes mainly in small firms. In contrast, 
it seems that institutions tend to invest more in large firms. Finally, the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board is positively related to institutional 
ownership, but negatively related to executive ownership, indicating that 
institutional investors (executives) might encourage (discourage) more non- 
executive directors on the board. 
-Insert Table 4.3 here- 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we test for the relationship between firni value and institutional 
ownership. We proceed by testing our hypotheses. Focusing on the role of 
institutional investors, our major thesis is that an institutional investor is a source 
of external influence on the board of directors and performance. 
4.5.1 Institutional ownership andfirm peýformance 
In this section we present our results that are based on a cross-sectional regression 
approach. In Table 4.4, we report the results of the regressions of firm 
performance, as measured by ROA, against ownership structure, board 
characteristics and other control variables. 
We start with a linear specification. Model (1) shows ROA as a function of 
ownership structure, board characteristics and other control variables. In general, 
the estimated coefficients are in line with the hypothesised signs. Specifically, all 
ownership concentration variables (including executive ownership, non-executive 
ownership, institutional ownership and other external shareholdings) are 
associated with better firm performance, revealing that ownership concentration is 
an effective incentive mechanism. Contrary to the expectation, our results show 
that a higher proportion of non-executive directors is associated with worse ROA, 
which indicates low management efficiency associated with a high proportion of 
non-executives. Our results also show the debt ratio is negatively related to ROA. 
while size and dividend payout ratio are positively related to ROA. 
ill 
Model (2) estimates a non-linear model by adding the square of executive 
ownership. 1n light of the work by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnel and Servaes 
(1990), model (2) allows for the possibility that a non-linear model provides a 
better description of the relationship between executive ownership and ROA. 
However, the total insignificance of executive ownership suggests little support 
for such a non-linear relationship. As suggested in Clay's work (2002), the 
incentive effect of higher managerial ownership might dominate entrenclunent 
effects everywhere once institutional ownership is controlled for, implicating a 
complementary relationship between managerial and institutional ownership with 
respect to firm performance. As such, we develop further models based on model 
(1) 24 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is a possibility that the free-rider 
problem reduces institutional monitoring and hence the influence of this on a 
finn's perfon-nance. In Panel B of table 4.4, we explore such a possibility by 
splitting the sample into two sub-samples according to whether the firm has other 
external large shareholdings. Since only shareholdings higher than 3% are 
disclosed in U& we first separate our sample according to whether firins have 
other external shareholdings higher than 3%. We detected no significant 
difference between the two samples (which is not reported here). This might 
suggest that a 3% shareholding by other shareholders is not big enough to trigger 
the free-riding problem. Therefore, following Short and Keasey (1997), we try 
5% as the benchmark of large shareholding. Panel B gives the results: the 
24 Theory does not offer predictions regarding the form of the relationship between non-executive 
ownership and perforniance. We also test a non-linear model by adding the square of non- 
executive o\N, -nership (which is not reported here). We did not detect any non-linear relation. 
I I? 
coefficient of institutional ownership is positive and significant only in the sub- 
sample where other external shareholding is less than 5%. This might suggest that 
institutional investors free ride on the monitoring of other shareholders when the 
other external shareholding is fairly high (at least 5%, in our case). We also split 
firms by whether there is a single institutional shareholding higher than executive 
ownership and run the regressions separately. However, we detect no significant 
difference (not reported here). 
To sum up, the results of the first stage of our analysis in Table 4.4 suggest 
that, consistent with the institutional monitoring hypothesis, institutional 
ownership is generally associated with better accounting performance. But after 
we split the sample, this association vanishes in the group where the other 
external shareholding is higher than 5%, which indicates a potential free-rider 
problem between institutional investors and other large shareholders. 
-Insert Table 4.4 here- 
4.5.2 Institutional ownership, executive directors and afirm'Speýfbrmance 
One of the most commonly-used methods corporate governance researchers have 
employed to assess the effectiveness of external monitors has been to examine 
whether those monitors moderate the relationship between inside ownership and 
firm performance. To explore this possibility, in Model (3) we interact 
institutional ownership with executive ownership. In this way, we test for the 
existence of both a main effect (the impact of institutional ownership on 
11' 
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performance) and a conditional effect (the impact of institutional ownership on 
the relationship between executive ownership and a firm's performance). The 
insignificance of the coefficient of interaction item shows that, in general, the 
conditional effect of institutional investors on accounting performance (ROA) 
remains insignificant. 
As we argued before, additional factors such as a free-rider problem and 
executive pressure might provide disincentives to institutional monitoring and 
intervention. To test this hypothesis, we split our sample again into sub-samples, 
then estimate our empirical model for each sample separately and check whether 
the coefficients of the variables retain their signs and significance across the sub- 
samples. Table 4.5 presents the results of the analysis. 
In Panel A, the sample is split into firms with other external shareholding 
higher than 5% and those without. Because of the free-rider problem, institutions 
are expected to be less actively involved in firm management when there is 
another external large shareholding; and the coefficient of the interaction item 
should be less significant in that sub-sample correspondingly. The results in Panel 
A show that the coefficient of the interaction item INST*EXO is only positive and 
significant in the firms where no other external large (>5%) shareholding is 
present. This finding is in line with our hypothesis: without a free-rider problem, 
institutional investors can curb executive discretion and strengthen the link 
between executive ownership and firni performance. 
Moreover, following Short and Keasey (1997), we assume that if there is a 
single institutional shareholding (LAIN) larger than the executive ownership 
(EXO), then the executive ownership is not sufficient to give executives 
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unfettered control. In this case, institutions would be more capable of monitoring 
and controlling the actions of executives. In Panel B, the sample is split into firms 
with or without a single institutional shareholding larger than the executive 
ownership. Panel B provides some evidence that is consistent with the conflict-of- 
interest hypothesis: the coefficient of the interaction item INST*EXO is positive 
and significant only in the sample where there is a single shareholding larger than 
the executive ownership. 
One might interpret the positive interaction between institutional ownership 
and executive ownership as evidence that the action of each mechanism is more 
effective when they pull in the same direction. A coalition of "value maximiser" 
might be formed of institutional investors and executive directors in firms where 
institutional investors can overcome any free-ride problem and executive pressure. 
-Insert Table 4.5 here- 
4.5.3 Institutional ownership, non-executive directors andfirm performance 
To explore further, we also interact institutional ownership with non-executive 
ownership and the proportion of non-executive directors in the board. In model 4 
(5), we detect that the interaction item between institutional ownership and non- 
executive ownership is significantly negative, while the interaction item between 
institutional ownership and non-executive proportion in the board is negative but 
weak. Contrary to hypothesis 3, which states that institutional investors would 
support the role of non-executives and hence strengthen their positi\-e influence 
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on firm performance, the results instead suggest that they might act as substitutes. 
Rediker and Seth (1995) argue that the presence of relatively large outside 
shareholdings and their monitoring would make outside directors on the board 
represent a less important mechanism. Since the board's monitoring potential is 
partly determined by the need for board monitoring, it is not surprising that the 
significant presence of institutional investors could reduce the need for the 
board's monitoring and thus make non-executives less effective. 
-Insert Table 4.6 here- 
In summary, the results of our analysis show that the relationship between 
corporate perforniance and institutional ownership is complex and is affected by 
other shareholding parties. At first we find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and performance (ROA). Although in general we didn't 
find significant evidence suggesting that the presence of institutional ownership 
curbs executive discretion, our results do show that institutional ownership 
strengthens the positive relationship between executive ownership and 
perfon-nance (ROA) in some circ-Lunstances, e. g. when no other large (>5%) 
external shareholder is present or when there is a single institutional shareholding 
larger than the executive ownership. The results are generally consistent with 
those of McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1997). 
Furthermore, no evidence suggests that institutional investors make non- 
executives work more effectively; our analysis even indicates some substitute 
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effect between the monitoring of institutional investors and non-executive 
directors. 
4.5.4 Robustness test 
All the above conclusions are derived from the accounting measure of 
perfonnance, ROA. As an additional robustness check, we use a second proxy for 
firm perforn-iance, Tobin's Q, and re-estimate the models. 
The results of the estimated models after using Tobin's Q as the proxy for 
perfonnance are presented in Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. Consistent with 
previous research (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes. 1990), we detect a 
curvilinear relationship between executive ownership and Tobin's Q. Hence we 
based our later analysis on model (2), where the square of executive ownership is 
included. With regards to non-executive directors, in line with the study of Mura 
(2006), we find that, although higher non-executive ownership does not lead to 
better market performance, the proportion of non-executives on the board does 
have a significant and positive effect. This is reasonable in the light of the 
findings of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), who show that the stock market reacts 
favourably to the appointment of additional outside directors. 
Consistent with Maury (2006), who finds that f1iin size is positively related 
to ROA but not to the market valuation, we also discover that size is positively 
related to ROA but negatively related to Tobin's Q. It seems that bigger firms 
enjoy higher accounting profits, but not higher market valuations. The coefficient J 
of the dividend payout ratio remains positively significant when using either ROA 
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or Tobin's Q, which lends certain support to the belief that higher dividend is 
related to better financial perfon-nance. 
Most importantly, we obtain consistent results with regard to institutional 
ownership. Our results reinforce the proposition regarding the direct association 
between institutional ownership and firni performance. Furthermore, we find that 
the positive relationship between executive ownership and Tobin's Q is 
strengthened by institutional ownership. 25 After we split the sample, we again 
find that the interaction item of institutional ownership and executive ownership 
is only significant if no other large (>5%) external shareholder is present, or if 
there is a single institutional shareholding higher than the executive ownership. 
This result is consistent with the free-riding and executive pressure hypothesis. 
Finally, Table 4.9 confirms that institutional investors do not make non-executive 
directors work. more effectively. 
-Insert Table 4.7 -4.9 here- 
In addition, our previous work finds that the trading behaviour of 
institutional investors affects their monitoring incentive and ability. From this 
point of view, the monitoring of dedicated institutional investors would reduce 
agency cost more effectively and lead to higher management quality and better 
performance, compared to transient institutional investors. In what follows, we 
split the institutional ownership into dedicated institutional ownership (INSTD) 
25 We also try to interact institutional ownership with the square of executive ownership in our 
analysis, however, the coefficient of this interaction item remains insignificant across all the 
regressions (which is not reported here). 
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and transient institutional ownership (INSTA), according to our definition in 
chapter 2, and find that dedicated institutional ownership is significantly 
associated with higher performance (measured through ROA). However, neither 
dedicated nor transient institutional ownership strengthens the link between 
executive ownership and performance. Finally, our regression results show that 
dedicated institutional ownership weakens the link between non-executive 
ownership and performance, which might indicate that the monitoring of 
dedicated institutional investors weakens the incentive effect of non-executive 
ownership. The results are reported in Table 4.10 (we also use Tobin's Q to proxy 
for performance; the results are similar and not reported here). 
-Insert Table 4.10 here- 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this study,, we use data from 833 UK-listed non-financial companies to 
examine the influence of institutional ownership on firm performance. 
Our empirical study finds some evidence suggesting that institutional 
ownership affects firm performance. For example, consistent with McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Clay (2002), our empirical results suggest that institutional 
ownership makes an appreciable difference to firm performance, specifically 
when there is no other large (>5%) shareholder. Moreover, distinct from most 
research, our study is aware of the interaction among different shareholder 
groups, including directors, institutional investors and other external shareholders. 
Our analysis finds that the presence of institution investors strengthens the link 
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between executive ownership and performance significantly if no other large 
(>5%) external shareholding is present, or if there is a single institutional 
shareholding higher than the executive ownership. Our hypotheses and results 
hence provide an integrated picture of the influence of institutional investors on 
firm performance: institutional monitoring not only contributes to better firni 
perfonnance, but also strengthens the incentive effect of executive ownership, 
specifically when it is free from any free-rider problem and/or it can overcome 
executive pressure. However, for non-executive directors, no evidence suggests 
that the presence of institutional investors makes them work more effectively. 
Therefore, there is some evidence suggesting valuable monitoring by 
institutions, and no evidence that institutional monitoring is harmful. All the 
available evidence is neutral or positive. The positive evidence is not compelling 
in some companies, which is not surprising, since institutional investors might 
suffer from a free-rider problem and/or executive pressure. 
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Table 4.1 
Variables, definitions and data sources 
Variables Definition and Source 
Return of asset, i. e. the ratio of operation profit to total assets (our own 
ROA calculation) 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity to book value of total asset (Our own 
Tobin's Q calculation) 
The percentage of equity ownership owned by executive directors 
EXO (Hemscott) 
The percentage of equity ownership owned by non-executive directors 
NEXO (Hemscott) 
INST The sum of institutional shareholdings greater than 3% (Heniscott) 
LAIN Size of the largest institutional shareholding (Hemscott) C) 
OTHO The sum of other external shareholdings greater than 3% (Heniscott) 
NEXP The proportion of non-executive directors in the board (Hemscott) 
SIZE The logarithm of total asset (Datastrectin) 
LEV Total debt over total asset (Datastreain) 
The sum of ordinary dividend and preference dividend over total asset 
DIV (our own calculation) 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics (N=833) 
Variable Mean Min Median Max S. D. 
ROA 0.02 -0.73 0.04 0.52 0.14 
Tobin's Q 2.07 0.48 1.58 15.10 1.68 
EXO (%) 10.67 0 2.54 82.13 15.85 
NEXO (%) 3.71 0 0.36 51.32 7.64 
INST 28.12 0 26.90 89.58 18.66 
LAIN 12.68 0 10.57 70.71 9.08 
OTHO (%) 7.64 0 88.99 2.95 11.55 
NEXP 0.50 0 0.5 0.9 0.15 
SIZE 11.29 6.98 11.13 18.70 2.13 
LEV 0.19 0 0.14 0.99 0.35 
DIV 1.93 0 0.01 37.35 2.83 
This table shows the sample characteristics for 833 listed firms. The means of variables 
are measured over 2004-2005. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. 
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Table 4.4 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting finn perfonnance using ROA Lý 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: ROA (Retuni of Asset) 
Panel A Panel B 
Predict 
ed Model I Model 2 OTH05% OTHO<5% 
EXO + 0.160*** 0.064 0.120** 0.175*** 
(5.13) (0.77) 1) (2. K (4.44) 
EXO 2 0.176 
(1.28) 
NEXO + 0.188*** 0.201*** 0.221 ** 0.13 1* 
(3.52) (3.68) (3.1)) (1.75) 
INST + 0.043* 0.044* -0.016 0.071** 
(1.68) (1.68) (-0.36) (2.12) 
OTHO + 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.184*** -0.095 
(4.09) (4.12) (3.52) (-0.23) 
NEXP + -0.067** -0.075** -0.068 -0.056 
(-2.14) (-2.33) (-1.38) (-1.37) 
SIZE 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.024*** 
(9.28) (9.28) (6.81) (6.11) 
LEV -0.048* -0.050* -0.073* -0.038 
(-1.92) (-1.95) (-1.86) (-1.50) 
DIV + 1.938*** 1.935*** 1.93 1 *** 1.970*** 
(10.17) (10.17) (5.53) (8.22) 
R2 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Number of 
firms 833 833 347 486 
ROA j, = aj + EXO,, 81 + NEXOi, )62+ INSTjt, 8', + OTHO it)64+ NEXP it 85+ SIZE, 066+ 
LEV, t)67+ DIVt)68+Sit. (1) 
ROA it = aj + EXO it 81 + EX02it 82 + NEXOit, 83+ INST,, 64 + OTHO it, 05+ NEYPt A+ 
SIZE, t, 87+ LEVt, 88+ DIVt, 89+8it. (2) 
This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting firm performance using ROA as 
a proxy for performance. Model I is a linear model, while model 2 estimates a non-linear 
model by adding, the square of executive ownership. In Panel B, we re-estimate model 
(1) for the sub-samples (with/without at least 5% non-institutional shareholding) 
separately. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. All regressions include 
industry dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. Definitions of the 
variables are given in Table 1. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. - indicates that the variable is not in the model. 
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Table 4.5 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting finn performance using ROA zD 
Dependent Variable: ROA (Return of Asset) 
Panel A Panel B 
Independent Predi 
Variables cted Model 3 OTHO>5% OTHO<5% EXO>LAIN EXO<LAIN 
EXO 0.13 1*** 0.170*** 0.106* 0.141 * -0.712 
(2.98) (2.61) (1.82) (1.90) (-1.61) 
NEXO 0.185*** 0.223*** 0.117* 0.196** 0.167** 
(3.46) (3.16) (1.66) (2.28) (2.59) 
INST 0.030 0.007 0.037 -0.001 -0.001 
(1.04) (0.16) (1.00) (401) (404) 
fNST*EXO + 0.182 -0.328 0.436** 0.2 ý 28 1.617* 
(1.07) (- 1.11) (2.04) (0.51) (1.87) 
OTHO 0.150*** 0.185*** -0.116 0.110* 0.144* ** 
(4.06) (3.56) (-0.28) (1.70) (3.28) 
NEXP + -0.063** -0.073 -0.044 -0.063 -0.057 
(-2.03) (-1.47) (-1.09) (-1.19) (-1.318) 
SIZE 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.037*** 0.024*** 
(9.26) (6.81) (6.03) (6.05) (7.08) 
LEV -0.048* -0.072* -0.037 -0.20-)*** -0.030** 
(-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.50) (--31.03) (-2.36) 
DIV 1.942*** 1.932*** 1.984*** 2.043 *** 1.809** 
(10.16) (5.53) (8.13) (5.74) (8.25) 
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.30 
Number of 
firms 833 347 486 260 573 
ROA j, = aj + EXO j,, 81 + NEW j,, 82 + INST it, 8_3 + INST*EXOt, 84 + OTHO t, 8_5 + NEXP it 
, 
86+ SIZE, t, 8 '+ 
LEVjt, 88+ DIVt, 89+ct. (3) 
Model 3 includes interaction item INST*EXO in the regression equation. In 
Panel A, we re-estimate model 3 for the sub-samples (with/without at least 5% 
non-institutional shareholding) separately. In Panel B, we re-estimate model 3 for 
the sub-samples (with/without a single institutional shareholding larger than 
executive ownership) separately. Definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. 
All regressions include industry dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.6 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting finn perfonnance using ROA 
Dependent Variable: ROA (Return of Asset) 
Independent 
Variables Predicted Model 4 Model 5 
EXO + 0.161*** 0.162*** 
(5.18) (5.18) 
NEXO + 0.298*** 0.296*** 
(4.03) (3.97) 
INST + 0.062** 0.080 
(2.26) (1.04) 
INST*NEXO -0.586* -0.579* 
(-1.85) (-1.81) 
OTHO + 0.149*** 0.150*** 
(4.04) (4.04) 
NEXP + -0.066** -0.057 
(-2.13) (-1.19) 
INST*NEXP -3.722 
(-0.26) 
SIZE 0.029*** 0.028*** 
(9.34) (9.34) 
LEV -0.051** -0.051** 
(-2.11) (-2.11) 
DIV + 1.918*** 1.916*** 
(10.13) (10.09) 
R2 0.30 0.30 
Number of firms 833 833 
ROA j, = a, + EXO,,, 81 + NEXOi,, 82 + INST i,, 8-? + INST* NEXOi,, 84 + OTHO 11,85 + ýVEXP it 
, 66+ SIZEit, 87+ LEVi,, 8, s+ DIVt, 89+ct. (4) 
ROA ,= aj + EXOi,, 81 + NE. VOt, 82+ INST,,, 8-3+ INST* NEXOit, 84+ OTHOit, 85 + NEA-P it 
, 
86+INST*NEXPit, 87+ SIZE,, 88+ LEVjt, 89+ DIV,, 8jo+ejt. (5) 
Model 4 includes interaction item INST*NEXO in the regression equation. Model 5 has 
both interaction items INST*NEXO and INST*NEXP in the regression equation. The 
variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions include industry dummies. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.7 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting firm perfonnance using Tobin's 
Independent 
Variables 
Predict 
ed 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
Panel A Panel B 
Model 6 Model 7 OTHO>5% OTHO<5% 
EXO + 1.239** 4.498*** 4.946** 5.198** 
(2.35) (3.14) (2.21 6) (2.44) 
EX02 -5.974*** -6.852* -7.005** 
(-2.66) (-1.89) 1) 1) (--. -0) 
NEXO + -0.771 -1.197* -0.972 -1.092 
(-1.17) (-1.76) (-1.15) (-1.13) 
INST + 0.868** 0.869** 0.807 1.003* 
(2.10) (2.13) (1.37) (1.86) 
OTHO + -0.739 -0.842 0.039 -0.856 
(-1.39) (-1.55) (0.05) (-0.66') 
NEXP + 1.348*** 1.614*** 1.846** 1.187** 
(3.47) (4.01) (3.22) (2). 0 7) 
SIZE -0.178*** -0.166*** -0.156** -0.183*** 
(4.78) (4.51) (-2.15) (4.88) 
LEV -0.111 -0.080 -0.04" -0.092 
(-0.63) (-0.46) (-0.07) (-0.54) 
DIV + 8.375*** 8.476*** -1.077 14.11 *** 
(3.40) (3.46) (-0.38) (5.97) 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.10 
Number of 
firins 833 833 347 486 
Tobin's Q it = ai + EXO it A- NEXOt, #2+ IN ST i1ft,, -, OTHO it, 
84+ NEXP t, 85+ SIZE it 
)66+ LEV, 1,87+ DIV 
(6) 
Tobin's Q j, ý aj + EXO,,, 81 + EX02 jtflý + NEW it, 
8.3+ INST it, 84+ OTHOt, 85+ NEXP 
j,, 86+ SIZE t)67+ LEV,, )O, ý+ DIV i,, 
89+cj,. (7) 
This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting firm perfon-nance using Tobin's 
Q as a proxy for performance. Model 6 is a linear model, while model 7 estimates a non- 
linear model by adding the square of executive ownership. In the following regressions 
we keep the square of executive ownership since it is proved to be significantly zn 
associated with Tobin's Q. In Panel B, we re-estimate model 7 for the sub-samples 
(with/without at least 5% non- institutional shareholding) separately. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. All regressions include hidustry dummies. T-statistic values are 
reported in parentheses. and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
1 
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Table 4.8 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting firm performance using Tobin's 
Independent 
Variables 
Pred 
icted 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
Panel A 
Model 8 OTHO>5% OTHO<5% 
Panel B 
EXO>LAIN EXO<LAIN 
EXO + 0.491 2.497 -0.370 2.657 -5.445 
(0.29) (1.15) (-0.14) (1.08) (-1.05) 
EXO 2 -1.951 -4.421 -1.201 -4.884 -2.748 
(-0.77) (-1.35) (-0.32) (-1.48) (-1.62) 
INST + 0.006 0.170 -0.011 -0.411 -0.479 
(0.02) (0.32) (-0.02) (-0.17) (-1.05) 
INST*EXO + 11.512** 8.252 13.661 ** 10.876 41.572** 
(2.41) (1.12) (2.18) (1.14) (2.05) 
NEXO -1.099 -0.932 -0.955 -1.776 -0.911 
(-1.62) (-1.10) (-1.02) (-1.38) 
OTHO -0.834 -0.009 -3.744 -1.305 I -0.4K 
(-1.57) (-0.01) (-0.64) (-1.35) (-0.75) 
NEXP 1.666*** 1.897*** 1.246** 2.001** 1.463 *** 
(4.17) (3.32) (2.17) (2.34) (3.54) 
SIZE -0.178*** -0.157** -0.207*** -0.257*** -0.152*** 
(4.97) (-2.23) (-5.33) (-2.86) (4.11) 
LEV -0.096 -0.080 -0.105 -0.209 -0.100 
(-0.54) (-0.13) (-0.68) (-0.18) (-0.73) 
DIV 8.648*** -0,916 14.082*** 1.997 10.575*** 
(3.72) (-0.33) (6.35) (0.44) (4.06) 
R2 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Number of 
Fin-ns 833 347 486 260 573 
Tobin's Q i, = ai+ EXOt, 6i + EX02it 62+ INS T, 63+ INST*EXO,,, 
64+ NEXOt, 85+ 
OTHO it, 86+ NEXP j,, 87+ SIZE it, 88+ LEVit, 89+ DIVjt, 8jo+-6it. (8) 
This table presents croSs-sectional regressions predicting firm performance using Tobin's 
Q as a proxy for perfon-nance. Model 8 includes interaction item INST*EXO 
in the 
regression equation. In Panel A, we re-estimate model 8 for the sub-samples 
(with/without at least 5% non-institutional shareholding) separately. In Panel B, 
we re-estimate model 8 for the sub-samples (with/without a single institutional 
shareholding larger than executive ownership) separately. The variables are defined 
in Table 1. All regressions include industry dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.9 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting firm performance using Tobin's 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
Predicted Model 9 Model 10 
EXO + 4.505*** 4.377*** 
(3.13) (3.06) 
EXO 2 -6.003*** -5.62 1 ** 
(-2.67) (-2.52) 
NEXO -1-905** -2.155** 
(-2.06) (-2.32) 
INST + 0.754* 3.1-'18*** 
(1.73) (3.38) 
INST*NEXO 3.765 4.747 
(0.90) (1.14) 
OTHO + -0.833 -0.741 
(-1.31) (-1.38) 
NEXP + 1.61 l*** 2.834*** 
(4.01) (3.06) 
INST*NEXP -4.774*** 
(-2.84) 
SIZE -0.167*** -0.167*** 
(-4.50) (-4.50) 
LEV -0.058 -0.064 
(-0.32) (-0.34) 
DIV + 8.604*** 8.328*** 
(3.53) (3.44) 
R2 0.09 0.09 
Number of 
firms 833 833 
Tobin's Q j, = a, + EXOi,, 81 + NEXOi,, 82 + INSTit, 83 + INST* NEXO, t 164 + 
OTHO,, 
185 + 
NEXP j, )66+ SIZE jtfi-+ LEVjt, 88+ DIVjt)69+e, t (9) 
Tobin's Q, = aj + EXOt, 61 + NEXOII, 6, + INST, t, 83+ INST* NEXO, 1,84+ OTHOj 85 + 
NEXP,, )66+ INST*NEXP,, 8, + SIZEit, 8x+ LEVit, 69+ DIVj, 
Ao+cjt. (10) 
This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting firin perforinance using 
Tobin's Q as a proxy for perforinance. Model 9 includes interaction item INST*NEXO in 
the regression equation. Model 10 has both interaction items INST*NEXO and 
INST*NEXP in the regression equation. The variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions include industry durnmies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***. 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. - indicates that 
variable is not in the model. 
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Table 4.10 
Cross-sectional regressions predicting finn perfon-nance using Tobin's Z: ) 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Independent 
Variables 
Predi 
cted Model II Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
EXO 0.158*** 0.138*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 
(5.08) (3.13) (5.15) (5.17) 
INSTI) + 0.063* 0.058* 0.094* 0.147 
(1.86) (1.48) (21.6 1) (1.43) 
INSTA 0.024 0.008 0.029 0.007 
(0.64) (0.19) (0.75) (0.06) 
I`NSTD*EXO + 0.049 
(0.21) 
INSTA*EXO + 0.240 
(0.91) 
NEXO + 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 
(3.52) (3.51) (4.09) (4.04) 
INSTD*NEXO + -0.987* -0.963* 
(-1.95) (-1.88) 
INSTA*NEXO + -0.209 -0.217 
(-0.55) (-0.57) 
OTHL + 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 
(3.92) (3.89) (3.84) (3.87) 
NEXP + -0.068** -0.066** -0.066** -0.056 
(-2.18) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-1.17) 
INSTD*NEXP + -0.104 
(-0.54) 
INSTA*NEXP + 0.044 
(0.21) 
SIZE 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
(9.38) (9.35) (9.42) (9.43) 
LEV -0.049* -0.049* -0.051** -0.051** 
(-1.92) (-1.93) (-2.07) (-2.07) 
DIV + 1.947*** 1.949*** 1.930*** 1.928*** 
(10.24) (10.24) (10.25) ')0) (10. ý 
R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Number of finns 833 833 833 833 
in these regressions we split the institutional ownership into dedicated institutional 
ownership (INSTD) and transient institutional ownership (INSTA) according to our 
definitions in chapter 2. This table presents cross-sectional regressions predicting firrn 
performance, using Tobin's Q as proxy for perfon-nance. Model II is the 
baseline model 
while model 12,13,14 include different ownership interaction 
items. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. All regressions include industry dummies. T-statistic values are 
reported in parentheses. and * indicate significance at the 
1%. 5% and 10% 
levels., respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
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The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, it investigates the governance role 
of institutional investors in companies where they hold significant stakes (>-'i%); 
and second, it attempts to provide deeper insights into the determination of 
corporate policy decisions and performance. Using a large sample of UK-listed 
firms, for which a unique database has been compiled, we show that the presence 
of institutional investors has several implications for corporate policy decisions 
and performance. 
Chapter 2 investigates the role of institutional investors in detennining 
director pay in publicly listed, non-financial UK companies. The focus has been 
on the distinction between institutional shareholders regarding their investment 
horizons. We have investigated whether institutional investors, in particular the 
more dedicated investors, impact the level of director pay and influence the pay- 
perforniance relation. Our findings suggest that institutional investors as a whole 
do not constrain director pay and strengthen the pay-performance relation. 
However, we are also able to provide evidence suggesting a positive role that 
dedicated institutional investors with long investment horizons can play. We find 
that dedicated institutional ownership not only restrains director pay level, but 
also strengthens the pay-performance relationship in firms where they have 
significant stakes. This finding is consistent with our expectation that dedicated 
institutions are more involved in corporate governance and serve a better 
disciplining role than other institutional investors with shorter investment 
horizons. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether dividend behaviour is affected by the control 
structure. Specifically, we examine the conventional wisdom that dividend and 
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shareholder control can be substitutes in mitigating agency cost and information 
asymmetry. We assume that firms controlled by financial institutions (IC firms) 
face higher agency costs and information asymmetry than firms controlled bý- 
director-owners and other individual shareholders (MC finns), dividend is thus a 
more valuable monitoring or signalling device for them. Using a panel of UK 
firms from 2000 to 2006, we use a random-effect probit model and partial 
adjustment models to investigate whether the identity of a controlling shareholder 
group affects dividend behaviour. Although we detect no evidence suggesting that 
firms controlled by financial institutions (IC firms) are more likely to be dividend 
payers than other finns, we find that IC finns significantly engage in dividend 
smoothing, while MC firms do not. In addition, MC (IC) firn-is adjust dividends to 
a greater (smaller) extent relative to current incomes. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that IC firms smooth dividend to a larger extent because they face 
higher agency costs and information asymmetry. 
In chapter 4, we examine both the direct and indirect impact of institutional 
ownership on firm performance. We control the additional factors that might 
provide disincentives to institutional monitoring. Our empirical results suggest 
that institutional ownership makes an appreciable difference to firm performance, 
specifically when there is no other large (>5%) shareholder. We also find that the 
presence of institution investors strengthens the link between executive ownership 
and perfomance significantly if no other large (>5%) external shareholding is 
present, or if there is a single institutional shareholding higher than the executive 
ownership. Our hypotheses and results provide an integrated picture of the 
influence of institutional investors on firm performance and suggest a 
133 
complementarity between institutional investors and executive directors with 
respect to firm performance. They also indicate that institutional monitoring 
might be subject to a free-rider problem and executive pressure. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the presence of institutional investors makes non- 
executive directors work more effectively. 
There is much more research needed concerning the importance of the 
presence of institutional investors. The empirical analysis in this thesis proposes 
some ideas that could be considered in future studies. One idea is that institutional 
investors can influence the whole corporate sector, for example in terms of 
executive compensation and dividend payout, and not just the targeted firms in 
takeovers, LBOs or governance initiatives. A second idea is that institutional 
investors are a far from homogeneous group., and the general insignificance 
attained by previous empirical studies is partly due to the pooling of all kinds of 
institutions. It is reasonable to expect more significant results with a proper 
differentiation among institutions. Third, future studies need to consider the 
complicated ways that governance mechanisms interact with each other. For 
instance, the choices of financial decisions might act as internal governance 
mechanisms; ownership concentration might thus substitute for or complement 
those mechanisms in reducing agency costs and/or information asynu-netry. In 
this, the monitoring of one shareholding party might be affected by other 
shareholding parties. 
There are other issues that deserve further attention in future studies. First, 
there is a need to develop a more sophisticated classification of institutional 
investors than that reported in this thesis. This can be achieved by examining 
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institutional trading behaviour from a long-period trading record (e. g. 5 years). In 
addition, if the data is available, three categories of institutional investors can be 
identified instead of two: (1) "transient" institutions, which exhibit high portfolio 
turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) "dedicated" institutions, 
which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firnis; and 
(3) ý 'quasi -indexers", which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar 
to an index strategy). Besides "transient" institutions, "quasi-indexers" are not 
expected to be active monitors due to their passive indexing strategy. Some 
studies have been made using this kind of framework, but the existing studies are 
restricted to US firms (Bushee, 1998). 
A natural extension of our work would be to investigate the implications of 
institutional investors on capital structure. The question rises about whether 
institutions have actively encouraged increased leverage, with a potential impact 
on performance. Research on this question remains inconclusive. Some studies 
suggest that institutional investors tend to encourage firms to lever up (Firth, 
1995); while others suggest that the direct discipline by institutional investors acts 
as a substitute for debt (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994). Another corporate policy 
decision that might be affected by institutional investors is investment. How does 
the presence of institutional investors affect a fim-i's investment policy? Wahal 
and McConnell (2000) find a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and long-ten-n investment. Bushee (1998) finds that managers are less 
likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is 
high, implying that institutions typically serve a monitoring role. Furthermore, we 
are curious about whether the presence of institutional investors would affect the 
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fon, n or the strength of the relationship between loncy-ten-n investment and ZZ) 
perfonnance, as suggested by Le et al. (2005). A satisfactory answer to these 
questions will enhance our understanding of the influence of institutional 
investors on corporate policy decisions. 
Finally, in this thesis we cover a variety of internal governance mechanisms. 
but more research is needed on the relationship between institutional ownership 
and external governance mechanisms. For example, would the presence of a large 
institutional shareholding affect the outcome of an M&A event? Stulz et al. (1990) 
find that higher institutional ownership is associated with lower acquisition 
premiums. The investment horizon of an institutional investor might also 
influence a target firm's bargaining position. Weaker monitoring from short-term 
investors could allow managers to proceed with value-reducing acquisitions or to 
bargain for personal benefits (e. g. job security) at the expense of shareholder 
returns. Gaspar et al. (2004) find that when the shareholders of the target hold a 
short-tenn view, there is a higher likelihood of a takeover with a lower cost. We 
therefore expect that firms held by short-tenn institutional investors have a 
weaker bargaining position in acquisitions. 
In conclusion, there remains considerable scope for future research about 
institutional ownership to continue and produce more interesting empirical results 
and theoretical papers. Further research might benefit from our insights about the 
corporate governance role of financial investors. Our work might also benefit the 
policy-makers, the management and the shareholders, in the sense that our work 
adds their widerstanding of the way ownership structure affects a company's 
financial decisions and perforniance. 
1 
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